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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of Russian offensive
air warfare theory from 1930 to the present day. The
revolution in military affairs caused by the development of
high-precision weaponry and advanced methods of detection has
transformed traditional concepts of warfare, making "remote
strikes" by aircraft and missiles an increasingly vital factor
in modern war. To Russian observers, the Persian Gulf War
offered proof that a paradigm shift has indeed taken place.
Despite radical technological change, the traditional
concepts of airpower employment developed in the 1930 's and
perfected during the Second World War remain essentially valid
despite visionary views on independent air warfare strategy.
However, the battle between offensive airpower and air defense
is now considered the critical factor in determining the
course and outcome of a war, but within the context of
combined arms operations and not independent strategic action.
The high effectiveness of emerging strike technology in the
Gulf War has led to priority Russian development of both
countermeasures and analagous capabilities. However, there is
agreement that the means of air defense alone are not
sufficient, and preemptive offensive conventional strikes are
widely viewed as the only acceptable alternative, even in the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Evolution of Russian Offensive Air Warfare Theory:
From Deep Battle to Aerospace War
LT Mark A. Admiral, USNR
June 1993
This thesis examines the development of Russian offensive
air warfare theory from 1930 to the present day. The
revolution in military affairs caused by the development of
high-precision weaponry and advanced methods of detection has
transformed traditional concepts of warfare , making "remote
strikes" by aircraft and missiles an increasingly vital factor
in modern war. To Russian observers, the Persian Gulf War
offered proof that a paradigm shift has indeed taken place.
Despite radical technological change, the traditional
concepts of airpower employment developed in the 1930 's and
perfected during the Second World War remain essentially valid
despite visionary views on independent air warfare strategy.
However, the battle between offensive airpower and air defense
is now considered the critical factor in determining the
course and outcome of a war, but within the context of
combined arms operations and not independent strategic action.
The high effectiveness of emerging strike technology in the
Gulf War has led to priority Russian development of both
countermeasures and analagous capabilities. However, there is
agreement that the means of air defense alone are not
sufficient, and preemptive offensive conventional strikes are
vii
widely viewed as the only acceptable alternative, even in the
framework of a defensive strategy.
Chapter One provides an introduction and overview.
Chapter Two provides a brief overview on the origins of Soviet
airpower theory from the early 1930 's to the end of the Second
World War. This chapter shows how concepts of centralized
control, massing of air reserves and combined arms employment
were developed into comprehensive operational art for air
warfare. Chapter Three covers the period between the end of
the Second World War and the Ogarkov era and examines the
continuity and change in airpower theory in the light of the
development of nuclear weaponry. The rebirth of the concept of
the air offensive as an integral part of a conventional war
scenario is examined and the impact of the military-technical
revolution caused by the integration of the computer into all
aspects of warfare. Chapter Four examines the lessons of the
Persian Gulf War related to airpower, including the increasing
importance of remote strike warfare and the introduction of
new weapons systems such as the reconnaissance-strike complex,
precision-guided weaponry and stealth technology. Chapter
Five examines how these changes impact Russian theory for the
employment of offensive airpower. The concept of aerospace
war, which advocates an independent strategic role for
airpower, is addressed and the shift in emphasis towards means
Vlll
of offensive strike warfare, as embodied in the 1992 Draft
Military Doctrine is examined. Chapter Six provides
conclusions and examines the impact on the U.S. Navy of the




After the Persian Gulf War, some Russian military thinkers
began to consider airpower as a force which could
independently influence the course and outcome of an armed
conflict. While the concept of an independent airpower
strategy has been common in the West since the end of the
First World War, the influence of the Soviet General Staff has
historically suppressed ambitions for an independent role for
any single military service and has instead viewed airpower
within the context of joint and combined arms operations.
The Persian Gulf War, in the Russian view, represents a
fundamental turning point in the nature of armed conflict.
The impact of high-precision weaponry and advanced sensor
technology has resulted in the massing of firepower rather
than the massing of maneuver forces. Increasingly, wars will
be fought by the means of "fire strikes" throughout the full
depth of the battlefield. Increasingly, the central role of
ground forces in short duration, high-intensity conventional
warfare is being questioned by airpower advocates and military
reformers.
An emerging school of "aerospace war" proponents see the
Gulf War as a prototype for future conflict in which aerospace
striking means can influence both the course and outcome of an
armed conflict. In Russian writings, a force which can
influence the course and outcome of a war is what would be
called in the West a force capable of independent decisive
strategic action. The aerospace warfare school envisions a
short , sharp armed conflict fought between cruise missiles
,
unmanned air vehicles, stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles
armed with conventional warheads, and spaceborne weapons and
sensor systems as a model for future war. These forces are
viewed as so capable that they now can accomplish missions
which previously could only be carried out by nuclear weapons.
Taking into account the changes in the fundamental nature
of war brought about by the revolution in military affairs,
the primary object of this thesis is to understand how Russian
concepts for airpower employment have changed and determine
whether an independent airpower strategy will replace the
traditional emphasis on joint and combined arms warfare. This
analysis will provide the basis for briefly examining the
implications of the revolution in military affairs as it
concerns the United States Navy.
The first substantive chapter of the thesis provides a
view of Russian offensive airpower theory from the 1930' s to
the end of the Second Great Patriotic War (1939-1945) .* It
1 The Russians now refer to the portion of the Second World War waged on the
Eastern Front as the Second Great Patriotic War, the first Great Patriotic War being
was in this period that the Western concept of an independent
air strategy was rejected and operational art emphasizing
combined arms employment was perfected.
The second substantive chapter covers the postwar period
up to the Persian Gulf War. In this time, traditional methods
of airpower employment in an operational role were supplanted
by the necessity to develop strategic nuclear strike
potential and strategic defenses. However, even with the
development of the nuclear bomber and ballistic missile, the
Soviet Union did not advocate a truly independent nuclear
strategy, but viewed nuclear strike potential as highly
effective but not capable of providing victory alone. The
concepts of operational air employment developed in the 1930'
s
also saw renewed interest as the Russians attempted to cope
with the possibility of a conventional conflict with the West.
The third substantive chapter includes recent lessons from
the Persian Gulf War. To many Russian observers, the Gulf War
demonstrated that Marshal Ogarkov ' s prediction of a new
revolution in military affairs was accurate. Of critical
importance is whether Russian observers view the Gulf War air
campaign as a traditional air offensive in a combined arms
context or whether the war demonstrates that airpower can
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812.
accomplish independent strategic tasks. 2 The impact of a new
generation of weaponry, including stealth aircraft,
reconnaissance-strike complexes and high precision weaponry is
examined and their impact on the future nature of war is
assessed.
In the fourth substantive chapter, the implications of the
military-technical revolution for Russian offensive airpower
will be discussed, including the development of the "aerospace
warfare" concept and the Strategic Non-Nuclear Force. The
effect of the Gulf War on the new Russian military doctrine
will be examined. The future composition of Russian offensive
conventional strike forces will be covered. Finally, a
conclusion chapter will summarize the author's conclusions and
discuss implications for the U.S. Navy.
2
If airpower alone can accomplish strategic tasks, an independent airpower strategy
would logically result. As a comparison, now matter how vocal Fleet Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov was on the value of navies, no independent naval strategy ever existed in the
Soviet Union.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ART OF AIR WARFARE
The evolution of Russian and Soviet offensive aerospace
warfare doctrine has occurred along a markedly different path
than Western thinking on the subject. In particular, the
emphasis on the operational level of warfare and the necessity
for the use of combined arms are vital principles which are
only now being considered by Western military thinkers. This
chapter will examine the continuity and change in Russian
military thought on the employment of offensive airpower and
compare and contrast them with Western concepts of air
warfare. The primary focus is on the use of airpower against
terrestrial targets.
To accomplish this, several key periods will be examined,
including the 1930 's development of operational art for
aviation and the rejection of the Western concept of
independent strategic airpower and the Second Great Patriotic
War, where Russian combined arms operational concepts were
validated.
This analysis will concern itself primarily with the
operational and strategic employment of airpower, and only
consider such elements as tactics and equipment as they
pertain to the study of airpower theory. As this study will
be primarily based on analysis of Russian literature, it is
important to understand that a tremendous gulf may in fact
exist between theory or doctrine itself and the ability to
successfully implement it. This has been a recurring theme in
Soviet and Russian history and is an especially important
consideration when looking at the present and projected future
military situation in Russia.
However, declaratory military doctrine and theory can have
inherent value despite its inability to be successfully
implemented at a given time and place. For example, the
concept of deep battle, developed by Russian theorists in the
1930' s, has proved very visionary and can be considered an
accurate model for current combat operations; this being in
spite of the Red Army's inability to fully carry out such a
doctrine until the third phase of the Second Great Patriotic
War.
A. THE IHTER-WAR PERIOD
The inter-war period marked the dramatic rise of Soviet
airpower from humble beginnings during the Civil War to its
status as the largest air arm in the world in the 1930' s.
Under Stalin's first two five-year plans, Soviet aircraft
industry made phenomenal advances and the Red Air Fleet grew
in size and capability to become among the most advanced air
forces in the world. The relative importance of aviation
increased as well. The size of the Air Force as a portion of
the Red Army personnel increased from 5.2 percent to 12.8
percent from 1929 to 1938. 3
1. The Development of Operational Art for Air Warfare
As the strength and sophistication of the Red Air
Fleet grew, the need for defining a theory of air warfare
became apparent. During the 1920' s, the great majority of
military thinking in the Red Air Fleet focused on air-to-air
and air-to-ground tactics. However, thinking on the
operational and strategic role of airpower soon followed. As
early as 1924, there is mention in official air fleet
regulations of using airpower in an operational context;
including special air operations both to gain superiority over
a front and to interdict headquarters, supply, reserve forces
and rail communications. 4
The period of the 1930 's was marked predominantly by
interest in the use of the heavy bomber. During the 1930' s,
over 800 TB-3, four-engine heavy bombers were produced; and at
the time of their introduction, they were among the most
3 Col. V. S. Yelizarov, "On the Question of Air Force Organizational Structure,"
Voennaya Mysl. No.l, Jan 1990, 30-36 QPRS-UMT-90-001-L, 22 Feb 1990, 17)
4 Col V. V. Anunchin and Lt Col O. N. Zhdorov, "Genesis, Development of the
Theory of Combat Employment of Air Forces (1917-1938)," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,
No. 8, Aug 88, pp 19-26 (JPRS-UMJ-89-002, 13 Feb 89, 15)
capable in the world. 5 The TB-3 bomber force had the
potential capability to strike both of the Soviet Union's
probable adversaries, Germany and Japan, from bases inside the
Soviet Union. 6
However, doctrinal differences were evident in the
perceived role of the heavy bomber. The theory of air warfare
advocated by Italian theorist, Gulio Douhet, incorporating
both the concept of an independent strategic bomber force and
the destruction of an enemy's will to resist by bombing
civilian targets, were never completely adopted by Russian
thinkers. During the 1930 's, there was considerable debate
over whether military or economic and political objectives
should be targeted. There was a dialogue in Soviet military
journals considering the nature of the target set and the role
of independent strategic bombardment. Air theorist, A.
Algazin, for example, advocated an independent air campaign
directed against the enemy's industrial infrastructure. To
aid in effective targeting of industry, he recommended
including those familiar with industry and trade to serve as
staff advisors to assist in the determination of critical
5 Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Origins of Soviet Research and Development System (1917-
1941)" (Ann Arbor, Mich: University Microfilms, 1986), 155
6 AVM R. A. Mason and John W. R. Taylor, Aircraft Strategy and Operations of the
Soviet Air Force (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1986), 127
8
nodes or bottlenecks (uskiye myesta) in the industrial
infrastructure. As an example of bottleneck targeting, he
noted that only two factories in France produced 90 percent
of total engine production. He also noted the vulnerability
of ports and rail lines as these could not be dispersed or
moved out of striking range, unlike industrial targets. 7
These concepts were very similar to emerging American views of
airpower employment developed by the Air Force Tactical School
which argued that the "application of military force against
the vital structure of a nation directly and immediately upon
the outbreak of hostilities is the most important and far
reaching development of modern times." 8
Douhet's concept of targeting population centers and
industrial capability was rejected in favor of deep strikes
against military objectives. The heavy bomber force was
assigned the role of supporting the deep-battle concept
pioneered by various Russian military theorists in the 1930' s.
A.I Egorov, Chief of the Red Army Staff, described the role of
the bomber force as follows:
7 A. Algazin, "Vozdushniye Operatsii Protiv Prom'shlennosti", Voennaya Mysi No 8-9,
1937, 99-104
8 Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air
Force 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press 1989), 81-82
In the event of an attack on the USSR by a capitalist
power or coalition. . . the task of our air force is to
strike at the roots of mobilization and at the
concentration of enemy armies, and to destroy the
economic-industrial life of whole regions, primarily those
of military significance. 9
While industrial targets remained in the target set,
Egorov emphasized the priority of striking military targets in
the depth of the rear in support of the strategic goals of the
"deep battle." A key element in the ultimate rejection of
true independent strategic bombing, as advocated by Douhet,
can best be explained by geography and the Russian continental
mind set. With its large frontier and lack of defensible
terrain, Russia has historically been highly vulnerable to
invasion. Conversely, Russia could effectively strike
offensively on the ground using these same avenues.
Therefore, the vital center of gravity in the Russian mind has
been ground forces. By contrast, Douhet' s theories,
enunciated in his 1921 book, Command of the Air , were uniquely
tailored to Italy's very different geostrategic position, with
Italy relatively invulnerable to ground assault by the natural
barrier of the Alps. Unlike Russia, Italy had difficulties
carrying out offensive operations with its ground forces
9 Mason and Taylor, 127
10
because of these same strategic realities. 10 These
geostrategic factors led to a Russian view that airpower would
be most effectively employed as an element of a combined arms
force. V. V. Khripin, Chief of Staff of the WS (Air Force)
was probably the most vocal advocate of the strategic bombing
force and wrote the foreword to the first Russian edition of
Command of the Air . 11 Even he, nevertheless, rejected
Douhet's assertion that airpower was the only means of
achieving victory in war and called those who advocated such
a theory "mechanistic visionaries." 12
Soviet air theory with regards to air superiority
differed from Western concepts as well. For instance, the
Soviet concept of air supremacy has subtle but significant
differences with the Western concept of command of the air.
Brigade Commander, Aleksander N Lapchinskiy, an instructor of
air warfare theory at the Frunze Academy, provided great
insight into the nuances of the Soviet concept of air
superiority. Firstly, he noted that the concept of command of
the sea should not be applied to air combat as Western nations
with maritime traditions did. He noted that naval warfare is
10 James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of Airpower (New York William Morrow
and Co., 1986), 126-127
11 Mason and Taylor, 126
12 Tsypkin, 148
11
more decisive because the means of destruction of naval forces
outpaces the ability to produce vessels. Air warfare, because
a nation can produce quickly both pilots and aircraft, begins
to resemble the attritional nature of ground warfare rather
than the decisive nature of naval combat. 13 According to
Lapchinskiy, an air force could not lose the war in an
afternoon. Lapchinskiy preferred a concept of local air
superiority, occurring at a given place and time, rather than
Douhet ' s concept of command of the air because the attritional
nature of air combat made such a decisive result impossible to
attain without a protracted struggle. The ultimate success of
the Red Army following the devastating aerial blows inflicted
on the Red Air Force during Operation Barbarossa indicate that
Lapchinskiy was prophetic in this regard.
Secondly, air superiority in the Russian mind has an
element of combined arms thinking which was virtually absent
from Western airpower theory. According to Lapchinskiy,
...it would be prejudice to think that air supremacy is
achieved through the efforts of aviation alone. Both air
and land forces participate in achieving this supremacy,
in which case the latter not only defend but also
attack. 14
13 Aleksander N. Lapchinskiy, "The Fundamentals of Air Force Employment" in The
Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott




In his work, Tekhnika i Taktika Vozdushnoqo Flota , Lapchinskiy
notes that ground forces can play a vital role in the
attainment of air superiority by the use of not only bomber,
fighter and ground-attack aviation, but also mechanized corps,
cavalry, artillery and airborne assault to strike at hostile
airfields. 15
The third difference was that air supremacy was not
simply sweeping the skies of enemy aircraft but being able to
effectively support ground operations and prevent the enemy
from doing the same. 16 The broader Soviet definition avoids
the problem of viewing the destruction of an enemy's air force
as an end rather than a means.
2. The Eclipse of the Heavy Bomber
As the decade wore on, the bomber lost its pride of
place in Russian air theory. In 1936, The Special Air Arm
(AON), consisting of all WS heavy bomber forces, was
established and directly subordinated to the Defense
Directorate; V. V. Khripin was selected as commander. This
reorganization was more to increase the centralization of
control for the bomber force to ensure an effective
concentration of airpower supporting a ground war rather than





for the purpose of waging an independent strategic air
campaign. The mission of AON was to provide air superiority
"on the main axes in the form of air-land (sea)
operations." 17 However, the formation of AON was the high
water mark of the heavy bomber in Soviet airpower theory as a
variety of events conspired to change the nature of Russian
airpower employment.
Perhaps the most influential cause of the demise of
the heavy bomber was Stalin's purges. All the major air
theorists of the time were victims of the purge f including
Khripin and Algazin. In addition, Russia's premier bomber




The bomber force suffered severe setbacks in the
period before the Great Patriotic War. By 1937, the
preeminence of the heavy bomber was being questioned.
Lapchinskiy believed that the heavy bomber's role was
threatened by the advent of very fast monoplane fighters and
began to favor the use of smaller fighter-bombers as a more
survivable alternative. 19
17 Col. Y. S. Yelizarov, "On the Question...", 17
18 AVM R. A. Mason, Aircraft, Strategy and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, 127
19 Tsypkin, 149
14
Subsequent combat experience in both the Spanish Civil
War and Winter War with Finland proved Lapchinskiy correct.
Soviet SB-2 medium bombers, while scoring initial successes in
the Spanish Civil War, suffered very heavy losses when
confronted with the German BF-109; an example of the new
generation of fast monoplane fighter. Likewise, Soviet bomber
forces suffered extremely heavy losses in the Winter War.
Nearly half of the 700-900 Soviet aircraft losses in this war
were bombers, including DB-3, SB-2 and TB-3 aircraft. 20
These losses occurred in the face of a crushing numerical
superiority as the Russians employed over 2,000 aircraft in
the campaign and the Finns could rarely muster more than 100.
The belief that the bomber would always get through had been
shattered. Bomber aviation also struggled with navigational
difficulties, coordination problems with fighter escorts and
problems with bombing accuracy which further undermined its
potential. 21
In addition, the crippled Soviet aircraft industry was
encountering difficulties in the development of a follow-on,
four-engine bomber to replace the venerable TB-3. As interest
waned in the heavy bomber following the purges, development of
20 Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise Of Soviet Airpower 1941-1945, (Washington




the TB-7, which eventually became the PE-8, occurred at a
leisurely pace. 22 At the beginning of the decade, the
general belief was that the bomber could easily penetrate air
defenses and Russia was in the enviable position of having the
world's largest bomber fleet. However, a classical dialectic
developed with the means of defense (fast monoplane fighters
and later radar) gaining a measure of ascendancy over the
heavy bomber. Russian airpower employment changed from an
emphasis on heavy bombers to an emphasis on tactical fighter-
bombers and ground-attack aircraft. Operations in the
tactical depth of the enemy's rear became the rule rather than
in the operational or strategic depth.
3. Air Warfare and the Three-Dimensional Battlefield
Despite the lack of an independent strategic vision
for airpower, Russian operational air theory was, with its
emphasis on combined arms employment and centralized control,
highly sophisticated. In 1936, the "Provisional Instructions
for Independent Operations by the Air Force of the Worker's
and Peasants Red Army" were published which officially
established the concept of the independent air operation,
which included only aviation assets. These regulations were
the foundation for the operational employment of airpower in
22 Tsypkin, 156
16
the Great Patriotic War and the basic concept of which still
applies today. 23 However, the term "independent" does not
refer to the pursuit of an independent strategy, but to an
operation (operatsiya) involving only aircraft which is
subordinated to the objectives of the ground commander.
As the role of the heavy bombing force faded, the role
of ground-attack aviation was expanding. The rise of ground-
attack aviation was intellectually spearheaded by Col. A.K
Mednis in the late 1930 's and fueled by the example of
Luftwaffe operations in Spain. Mednis realized that ground-
attack aircraft were far more effective against small, mobile
targets than were high-altitude bombers. 24 He advocated
employment in the tactical and operational rear beyond the
range of artillery and was a firm believer in the centralized
control of air power. "If ground-attack aviation is spread
around and subordinate to too many commanders, it will deliver
uncoordinated and unwise attacks." 25 His description of
ground-attack missions include the following goals:
23 Mar Avn P. S. Kutakhov, "The Conduct of Air Operations," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy
Zhurnal, No. 6, Moscow, 1972 in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975,
(Washington D.C., U.S Government Printing Office, 1976), 240
24 Artur K. Mednis, "Fundamentals of the Operational-Tactical Use of Ground
Aviation" in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, Harriet Fast Scott and




destruction of the enemy air force, destruction and delaying
of enemy troop reserves which are being brought up, attacking
detected troop concentrations and disrupting supply and
command and control. 26 Lapchinskiy , in his book, Vozdushnaya
Armiya , published after his death, provided the ultimate
expression of prewar Soviet thinking on airpower and its role.
...Ground and Air Forces must operate together to achieve
a common goal. Aviation will help the land front to the
extent that it offers greater possibilities for offensive
action in comparison to the enemy by conducting a number
of its own successive independent operations... When a
massive offensive Army is at hand, the main mission of the
Air Army is to support the forward movement of this army.
When a war of maneuver is waged, we must win the air-land
battle encounters that begin in the air and end on the
ground; this would require the concentration of all air
forces. 27
At the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet
Union had made great strides in the development of aviation
theory and developed an alternative vision to that of Western
air theorists based on centralized, but not independent,
control of air assets and combined arms operations. However,
a combination of organizational handicaps and shortcomings in
26
Ibid.
27 A. N. Lapchiskiy, Vozhdushnaya Armiya, Moscow, 1939, 98, 119, 137, 144, quoted
in M. N. Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the
Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, (Moscow, Nauka, 1977) (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, n.d) 27
18
both aircraft and personnel quality made advanced theory
irrelevant.
B. THE SECOHD GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
In 1940, a reorganization of the Air Force was conducted
in the wake of the Russo-Finnish War and the Khalkin-Gol
border skirmish with Japan which was intended to increase the
responsiveness of air assets. Aviation was divided into High
Command Aviation (Stavka Asset), Frontal Aviation (Military
District Asset), Army Aviation (Combined Arms Army Asset) and
Troop Aviation (organic to ground forces). 28 Because of
these reorganizations, the multi-layered nature of Soviet air
organization led to a "penny packet" approach to the
employment of airpower.
1. The Initial Phase (June 1941-Mar 42)
On 22 June 1941, the German military commenced
Operation Barbarossa with a series of devastating strikes on
airfields in the Western U.S.S.R. Between 22 and 30 June
1941, the Soviets lost over 4,000 aircraft, out of an
estimated 8,000 to 10,000 total aircraft in service. 29 The
majority of the aircraft destroyed were fighters, as they were
deployed in an offensive posture near the border.
28 Col. Y. S. Yelizov, 18
29 Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, 15-17
19
The Soviet long-range bomber fleet, subordinated to
the Stavka High Command, were located well to the rear and
survived the initial air strikes. The desperate situation on
the ground and the fact that the Axis had attained almost
complete air superiority meant that the vast majority of Long-
Range Aviation's sorties would be in direct support of ground
forces. 30 In desperation, these bombers were thrown at
advancing panzer spearheads in daylight many times without
fighter escort and suffered heavy attrition.
While the vast majority of the bomber forces were
attacking tactical targets, some use was made of long-range
bomber forces and bombers from naval aviation to strike at
Berlin and other targets, such as Ploesti. However, these
raids were too small to have any other effect than propaganda
value and in this regard were very similar to the U.S
Doolittle Raid. 31
As bomber attrition took its toll, the Air Force
became ever more reliant on ground-attack aircraft and fighter
bombers to accomplish its mission. Mednis' vision of ground-
attack aviation being more effective than the heavy bomber in
30 Col Gen Avn V. V. Reshetnikov, "From the Experience of Launching Long Range
Raids Against Military-Industrial Objectives," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No.9, Sept
86,34-40
31 Von Hardesy, Red Phoenix: The Rise Of Soviet Airpower 1941-1945, 85
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combined force operations proved accurate. In particular, the
Ilyushin 11-2 Stormovik proved exceptionally effective in
supporting ground operations. While only 249 of these
aircraft were on hand at the beginning of the war, production
of these highly effective ground-attack aircraft became a
priority. However, by December 1942, daily production of II-
2's reached 40 per day and they then represented 30 percent of
the Russian Air Force. 32 The wartime priority on the
production of ground-attack aircraft was best illustrated by
Stalin's confrontation with aircraft factory directors who
were emphasizing fighter production in December 1941. Stalin
stated:
You have let down our country and the Red Army. You are
still not facilitating the production of IL-2's. The 11-2
is as vital to our Red Army as air or bread. ... I demand
the production of more 11-2' s. This is my last warning.
Stalin. 33
As a result of both enemy air superiority and the
emphasis on ground-attack, the trend away from operations in
the deep rear of the enemy and towards close air support on
the battlefield became pronounced.
32 Col. V. V. Anuchin, "Aviation Tactics Against Tanks," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,
No. 7 July 1987, 29-36 (JPRS-UMJ-88-001, 19 Feb 1988, 16
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2. The Second Phase (Apr 42- Dec 43)
A critical element in developing the operational art
of airpower employment was the development of a High Command
Reserve for air units. As early as late July 1941, six
reserve air groups were formed to increase the ability to mass
airpower over critical sectors. Skillful use of High Command
Reserves in the winter counteroffensive near Moscow enabled
the Soviet Air Force, for the first time, to gain local air
superiority. 34 By Fall 1942, 13 Air Corps, each consisting
of two divisions of 120 to 270 aircraft, had been created,
including not only heavy bombers, which had been a traditional
Stavka asset, but also fighters and ground-attack aircraft.
By war's end, over 30 such corps had been created. 35
In addition to the establishment of a Stavka Reserve,
an overhaul of Air Force organization was also necessary. The
basic air organization resulting from the 1940 reforms proved
inadequate for concentrating effective force. In April 1942,
General A. A. Novikov assumed Command of the Air Force and set
about the urgent task of reforming the Air Force. Prior to
the Novikov reforms, both Military Districts and armies had
air assets attached to them. Over 50-55 percent of air assets
34
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were located at the army level which led to a dissipation of
effect. 36 The consolidation of aviation assets at this
level enabled a large concentration of air assets over
critical areas of the front by massing Air Armies from
adjacent fronts and increased the ability to conduct
operational-strategic missions and enabled the air superiority
battle to be waged far more effectively. 37
The new organizational changes, coupled with the
increased numbers and quality of Soviet aircraft production
,
allowed for the increasingly effective use of the air
offensive operation. For example, an air offensive in the
Kuban region in April 1943 was conducted for nine days in
order to gain air superiority for an upcoming offensive.
Eighteen German airfields were attacked by aircraft from four
air armies, Black Sea Fleet Naval Aviation and elements of
Long-Range Aviation which struck as deep as 300-350 kilometers
behind German lines. 38
As air superiority was obtained over the battlefield,
the Red Air Force began to conduct independent air operations
36 Col Gen Avn B.F Korolkov "Improving Command System of Frontal Aviation",
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against the operational rear of the German Forces. In early
1943, long-range bomber forces conducted a series of air
operations against rail lines of communication up to a depth
of 400 kilometers in order to disrupt the preparations for the
Kursk battle. 39 In preparation for the German summer
offensive in 1943 , a large independent air operation was
conducted by six air armies from 6-8 May, with the objective
of the destruction of enemy aviation over a 1200-kilometer
front from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov. 40
3. The Final Phase (1944-45)
The final phase of the war was marked by decisive
Soviet air superiority, overwhelming application of airpower
and a new flexibility in employment. The use of the Stavka
reserve and the massing of multiple air armies on a single
front enabled the Soviets to mass crushing air superiority
over the main axes of the offensive. Whereas 1,400 Soviet
combat aircraft fought at Stalingrad, more than 6,000 aircraft
participated in Operation Bagration and over 7,500 aircraft in
the final offensive on Berlin. 41
39 Col. N. I. Belousov, "Use of Long-Range Aviation to Disrupt Enemy Rail Traffic,"




In the concluding phase of the war, Soviets showed
increasing flexibility with regards to the concentration of
air assets. New concepts were developed during the Lvov-
Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder and East Prussian offensives to
support rapidly moving armored forces conducting exploitation
on an increasingly fluid battlefield. Air assets, especially
fighters and ground-attack aircraft, were operationally
subordinated to tank armies and mechanized groups (operational
maneuver groups) conducting deep penetrations in a manner
analogous to direct support artillery. 42
Long-Range Aviation was also used far more effectively
in the third stage of the war. During the Byelorussian
offensive, all eight corps of Long-Range Aviation were used in
a single operation for the first time, primarily targeting
lines of communication. 43 In 1944, Long-Range Aviation began
to conduct a series of independent air operations against
industrial and economic targets in both Hungary and Finland
with the intention of demoralizing these minor axis allies
42 Col Gen Avn B. F. Korolkov, "Improving the Command System Of Frontal




into making a separate peace. 44 By 1945 , Long-Range
Aviation, now redesignated the 18th Air Army and subordinated
to the Air Force, began to conduct strategic operations
against Germany. In April 1945, Long-Range bomber forces
conducted a strike on Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) which included
over 500 bombers and 200 escorting fighters. 45 Despite
these strategic raids, the overwhelming emphasis of Long-Range
Aviation remained support of ground forces in the operational
and tactical depth. Over the course of the war, Long-Range
Aviation flew only 3 . 1 percent of the total sorties versus
strategic target sets . Forty and four-tenths percent of the
sorties were in direct support of the battlefield, 30.6 were
against operational targets such as reserves and rail
communications, and 9.6 percent were sorties against
airfields. 46 These figures demonstrate the predominate use
of even Long-Range Aviation in the operational and tactical
roles
.
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4. Soviet and Western Air Theory
Soviet prewar theory on air operations which
emphasized the attritional nature of air combat, centralized
control, and the necessity for combined arms operations, were
proved valid by combat conditions on the Eastern Front.
Soviet military thought had been tempted by, but ultimately
rejected the principle of victory through the independent use
of strategic airpower. Unlike the American vision of
airpower developed by the Air Force Tactical School, which
advocated targeting the industrial infrastructure first,
Soviet Air operations placed primary emphasis on targeting
military-industrial targets only when conditions at the front
enabled aircraft to be spared. Operations against economic
and industrial centers were predominately contingent on
adequate support being available to support ground operations.
Another important factor was the view of air warfare
as attritional in nature rather than immediately decisive. In
stark contrast, American air planners took a very
deterministic view of air power's potential. The initial
American plan for the strategic air campaign against Germany,
AWPD-1, implied that airpower could be the decisive force in
the war. Airpower was to support an invasion of Europe "only
27
if it became necessary." 47 The Combined Bomber Offensive by
both Britain and the United States proved to be very costly in
both men and equipment. It is estimated that the British
strategic bombing campaign at times took fully a third of the
British war effort. 48 Likewise, losses were staggering, with
America losing over 8,000 B-17 and B-24 bombers in the
European Theater and the British losing over 4,000 heavy
bombers
.
49 With the Soviet Union engaged in a struggle in
which the center of gravity was the German Army, such a costly
campaign was simply beyond their means.
However, the effectiveness of Soviet airpower in
support of the ground war was not inconsequential. Over 75
percent of all German aircraft destroyed during the Second
World War were destroyed on the Eastern Front. 50 Another
indicator of the effectiveness of Soviet airpower is the
amount of kills scored by Russian aces during the war. Eight
pilots scored 50 or more kills while the highest-scoring U.S.
47 Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air
Force 1907-1960, Maxwell Air Force Base, 1989, Air University Press, 109
48 Lee Kennet, A History of Strategic Bombing, New York, 1982, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 181
49 Arthur B. Metcalf, "Strategic Bombing in Conventional Warfare: Some
Considerations", Strategic Review, Spring 1991, 19
50 Kozhevnikov, 226
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pilot scored only 40. 51 The attritional air battles over the
Kuban and Kursk played an important role which is often
overlooked because of the lack of an independent air strategy.
C. COHCLUSIOH
The period between 1930 and 1945 saw the evolution of air
power theory from untested concepts to operational art proven
in the crucible of battle. However, Russian airpower theory
developed upon a significantly different path than Western
airpower concepts, driven by geostrategic factors,
technological shortcomings and the influence of the Stavka.
The Russian heavy bomber force, despite being the largest in
the world in the early 1930' s, did not subscribe to a concept
of independent strategic bombing along the lines advocated by
the Italian air theorist Douhet. Instead, a target set which
could most effectively influence the conduct of the ground war
was chosen.
During the late 1930 's, a shift towards tactical
employment of airpower became prominent as the heavy bomber
was proven increasingly vulnerable to defenses and
technological progress stagnated. The fighter-bomber and
ground attack aircraft became the dominant element in Russian
51 Von Hardesy, 256
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air warfare theory. Air theorists such as Lapchinskiy and
Mednis defined new concepts of operational employment for
airpower which would prove a sound framework for a resurgent
Red Air Force. By emphasizing centralization of control and
combined arms operations, the Red Air Force waged a series of
highly effective air operations
,
gaining air superiority by
attrition and eventually dominating the three-dimensional
battlefield. However, because of a lack of an independent
strategy, the effectiveness of the Red Air Force in combined
arms operations is often underestimated. Given the tremendous
opportunity costs of building a strategic bombing force, the
Russian concept of air warfare as a combined arms element was
a cost effective alternative to an independent strategic
force. However, the development of nuclear weaponry would in
one stroke change the Russian concept of airpower employment.
30
III. THE POST WAR PERIOD: TECHNICAL REVOLUTION
A. 1950-1953
The Soviet Air Force experienced a tremendous growth in
both size and capability during the immediate postwar period.
By 1953 , the amount of troops in the Air Force as a percentage
of the total military more than tripled. 52 As a result of
the development of nuclear weaponry, the greatest threat to
the survival of the Soviet Union was now the long-range
nuclear bomber, not the massed ground forces of the Great
Patriotic War. This forced the Soviet military and Air Force
to adopt by necessity the principles of strategic air warfare
which had been rejected during the Great Patriotic War.
Primary emphasis was placed on both an effective air defense
system and a strategic offensive bombing capability.
The windfall from captured German technology allowed the
Soviet Union, through determined effort, to close the
technological gap with the West. New jet fighters, such as
the MiG-15, were fully equal to their Western counterparts.
Priority production was placed on interceptor aircraft which
could both provide for homeland defense and win the vital
52 Yelizarov, 19
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battle for air superiority over the battlefield. However, the
reality of airpower in the nuclear age led to a priority being
placed on air defense and offensive strategic bombing. As an
example, initial production of the advanced MiG-15 fighter was
allotted not to frontal aviation but to National Air
Defense. 53
Intense effort was also placed on developing a strategic
bombing force. The weight of the Soviet military-industrial
complex was placed behind the development of both nuclear
weaponry and means of delivery. The Soviets rushed into
production a carbon copy of the B-29, the Tu-4 Bull. In
marked contrast to the lack of interest in heavy bomber
aircraft during the war, over 1,500 Tu-4's were built until
production ceased in 1954. 54 However, the Tu-4 could not
reach the continental United States from bases in the Soviet
Union so development work began on two truly intercontinental
bomber aircraft, the turboprop TU-95 Bear and the turbojet M-4
Bison, as well as the TU-16 theater bomber. " Despite the
priority development of a strategic bombing force, the Western
concept of victory through the independent use of airpower was
53 Dr Jacob Kipp, "Soviet Tactical Aviation in the Post-War Period," Airpower Tournal,
Spring 1988, 16




still not fully accepted by the Soviet military: According to
a 1949 Voennaya Mysi article:
Soviet military science considers that the outcome of a
war under current conditions is decided on the field of
battle by means of the annihilation of the armed forces of
the enemy, and that one of the most important tasks of
aviation is active assistance to the ground and naval
forces in all the forms of their combat activity. The
fundamental mission of aviation is not contradicted by the
need to strike deep in the rear of the enemy, on his
military-industrial targets, but our military science does
not view such blows as an end in themselves, but only as
a helpful means of creating favorable conditions for the
success of combat operations of the ground and naval
forces. 56
This statement demonstrates the continuity between prewar and
postwar thinking on the employment of the strategic bomber as
an element of combined arms warfare in spite of the
development of nuclear weapons.
B. THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA AND THE HUCLEAR REVOLUTIOH (1954-1964)
The emphasis on nuclear weaponry increased during this
time and the trends continued to support strategic nuclear
forces, such as offensive means of delivery and air defense,
over conventional forces. Furthermore, advances in both
ballistic missile and anti-aircraft missile technology were
believed to be rendering the manned aircraft obsolete.
56 Col Gen Avn Nikitin, Voennaya Mysl, February 1949, quoted in Mason and Taylor,
133-134
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These shifting priorities led to a relative decrease in
the importance of aviation. Between 1950 and 1960 the size of
Frontal Aviation drastically decreased from 16,000 to less
than 4,000 aircraft. 57 This was largely in light of the
belief that the air operation which was developed during the
Great Patriotic War was deemed to have little utility in the
age of nuclear weaponry. 58 Ground-attack aviation, the
backbone of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War,
was disbanded in 1956. Simultaneously, the development of a
turbojet follow-on to the long serving 11-10 Stormovik was
curtailed despite it showing great potential. 59
To the Soviets at this time, the decisive weapon in a
future war at both the theater and strategic level would be
the long-range nuclear missile. In 1959, the Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) were established as a separate command, and were
given immediate priority ranking among the services. 60
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The development of the thermonuclear weaponry and an
effective rocket delivery system led to Douhet's vision of
strategic warfare against the military economic potential
being realized. According to Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii,
strategic air warfare in the Second World War was not decisive
to the course and outcome of the war, only the defeat of an
enemy's armed forces and seizure of an opponent's homeland
could achieve victory. However, a single missile with a
thermonuclear warhead could deliver many times more explosive
power than the two million tons of bombs dropped by the
British and American bomber offensives against Germany from
1940 to 1945. 61 As a result of this the SRF were viewed as
capable of independent strategic warfare. Sokolovskii makes it
clear that these forces are the primary element in warfare and
do not exist to support ground forces. 62
While the Soviet missile programs for both
intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
were advancing rapidly, development of intercontinental
bombers proved difficult. Furthermore, the development of
surface-to-air missiles seemed to indicate that the manned
61
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bomber could not effectively penetrate a modern air defense
network. Sokolovskii states:
In recent years there has been keen competition between
bombers , missiles and air defense weapons. In this
competition, air defense weapons have gained the advantage
over bomber aircraft... Consequently, bombers are
yielding rapidly first place intercontinental and
intermediate range ballistic missiles. Front-line
(tactical) bombers are also being gradually replaced by
missiles. 63
Thus, while the vision of Western air power theorists in which
decisive strategic strikes decide the course and outcome of
the war had finally been completely accepted by the Soviets,
the means was the nuclear missile and not the traditional
heavy bomber.
The Soviets also did not accept Douhet's concept of
targeting population centers. Rather, the target set would
closely resemble the target set allotted to the heavy bomber
force during the past, the destruction of command and control,
military targets, military economic potential and lines of
communication in the deep rear. 64 In addition, while deep
strikes with nuclear weaponry may be decisive, they continued
to be viewed as only one element in a war which includes
63
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operations by ground, air and naval forces as well, including
the occupation of "strategically important regions." 65
Destruction of an enemy's military industrial potential was
now given a coequal status to the destruction of ground
forces, but did not replace it as a mission. 66 It is clear
from Sokolovskii ' s writing that nuclear strikes, despite their
decisive nature, are a means to victory rather than an end.
The nuclear destruction of targets in the United States, while
deciding the course and outcome of the war, would have been a
means to allow the occupation of vital areas, such as Western
Europe, as a final war aim.
C. AVIATION RESURGENT (1964-1982)
While military thought associated with the Revolution in
Military Affairs had assumed that a war with the West would be
nuclear from the beginning, this was soon to change. After
the October 1964 Communist Party Plenum, it was accepted that
Khrushchev had placed too much of an emphasis on nuclear
weaponry and that a future war in Europe could have an initial
conventional phase. In such a conventional phase, it would be






and impressive airpower capability. 67 Therefore,
conventional aircraft striking power had assumed the mission
of theater nuclear forces in the initial phase of a conflict.
As Soviet interest in a possible conventional phase of
conflict increased, the Israeli air strikes during the Six-Day
War demonstrated the strategic effectiveness of airpower in a
conventional strike role. On the morning of 5 June 1967, the
Israeli Air Force launched a surprise preemptive strike on 16
Egyptian airfields. During the afternoon, airfields in Syria
and Jordan were targeted. By dusk, over 270 Arab aircraft had
been destroyed both in the air and on the ground, representing
over 60 percent of their total inventory? Israeli losses were
less than 10 percent. Having gained air superiority, on 6
June, the Israeli Air Force went over to supporting the ground
battle. 68 This highly successful air campaign would serve as
a model for evolving concepts of airpower employment in a
conventional war scenario.
The developing realization that there might be an initial
conventional phase to a conflict led to an increasing emphasis
on airpower to conduct deep strikes with the primary target
set being the enemy's nuclear means, which had previously been
67
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assigned to nuclear weapons. In 1970, A. A. Sidorenko stated
in his book, The Offensive , that airpower should accomplish
the following tasks:
Modern front aviation. . .can launch powerful and accurate
strikes against the enemy with nuclear and conventional
ammunition to a great depth under the most varied weather
conditions and destroy the means of nuclear attack,
personnel and equipment... An important quality is its
capability to discover independently and immediately
destroy enemy means of nuclear attack. 69
Soviet air theory was also greatly impacted by the
experience of local wars occurring in the 1970' s. The air war
in Vietnam, while not having as great an impact on Soviet
thinkers as the Six-Day War, nevertheless provided important
lessons. Vietnam saw the first employment of precision-
guided munitions, the widespread use of electronic
countermeasures and the long awaited contest between surface-
to-air missiles and strategic bombers.
Perhaps the most important element in the conflict was the
development and employment of precision guided weapons for the
first time. According to Soviet sources, the guided bombs
69 A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive: A Soviet View, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: US
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enabled a ten-fold reduction in the amount of aircraft
assigned to destroy a target. 70
The advent of electronic countermeasures and suppression
tactics led to a reassessment of the deterministic view that
surface-to-air missiles meant an end to the viability of
manned aircraft. This new view acknowledged "the systematic
development of two types of forces (air forces and air
defense) and an absence of clear superiority of one over the
other." 71 The best example of this was the Linebacker II
raids conducted against North Vietnam in late 1972. The B-52
force suffered a two percent attrition rate which , while
significant , clearly did not demonstrate the ascendancy of the
surface-to-air missile over the strategic bomber. However,
this was credited in part to the tremendous amount of
supporting strikes against airfields and air defense
facilities by tactical aviation as well. 72 This fact also
underlined the growing role of support aircraft. Of total
sorties over the North, 25 percent were for electronic warfare
and 25 percent were for active suppression of defenses. 73
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The 1973 Yom Kippur War confirmed that air warfare had
primarily become dependent on control of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The Israeli Air Force by the end of the war had
lost almost a third of their inventory of aircraft, 90 percent
of which were destroyed by sophisticated ground-based air
defense systems, to which the Israelis initially lacked
effective countermeasures. 74 Soviet sources acknowledged
that,
Surprise in ECM warfare came to be valued no less than in
(sic) the tactics of the aviation strike force.
Survivability in both cases depended on the lack of
readiness of the enemy to adopt effective answering
measures. 75
Another important element was the lack of effectiveness of
Israeli airstrikes versus airfield targets. Unlike the Six-
Day War, in which Arab aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip
in the open, during the Yom Kippur War Arab aircraft were
deployed in concrete shelters which made them difficult to
destroy. Also, strikes against runways could be easily








Consequently, air superiority had to be gained as a result of
air-to-air combat.
The concept of the Air Operation became more fully
developed in this period as increasing capabilities of
conventional weaponry allowed airpower to fulfill roles that
had previously been reserved for nuclear weapons . In the
early 1970' s, a new generation of highly capable aircraft
entered the inventory, including the MiG-23 fighter, the SU-24
Fencer deep strike aircraft, the TU-22M theater strategic
bomber, and the SU-17 and MiG-27 tactical strike aircraft
which offered greatly improved capability in the offensive
strike roles. As the range and effectiveness of aircraft
increased, the Soviet concept of air supremacy evolved to
encompass an entire theater of operations. In a 1968 Voennaya
Mysl article, Col N. Semenov describes the changes that have
occurred in the concept of air supremacy since the Second
Great Patriotic War:
In contrast to the past, the capabilities of modern
aircraft permit them to carry out in short periods broad
maneuver for the purpose of gradually increasing the
efforts and replenishing the losses in any zone of a
theater. Therefore, in all likelihood it is impossible to
gain air superiority in a limited region or zone. The
question of achieving air supremacy can now only be raised
on the large operational or strategic plane. 77
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Because of these factors, the air operation became a
theater level strategic undertaking which greatly increased in
scope over the majority of the air operations in the Great
Patriotic War. The most instructive view of the nature of the
theater air operation comes from the Voroshilov Academy
Lectures , which describes the nature of the air operation in
the mid-1970' s.
The goals of the air operation were delineated as follows
:
• destruction of enemy aircraft and flight personnel at
airfields;
* destruction of enemy aircraft and flight personnel in air
combat
;
* destruction of enemy naval strike aircraft in their combat
maneuver areas or at their bases;
* destruction of enemy control and air navigation systems;
* destruction of enemy nuclear ammunition depots, POL,
ammunition and material-technical supply depots;
* destruction and mining of enemy runways and airfields 78
The influence of the Six-Day War experience is evident in
the concept of the air operation. Success in the operation
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was calculated as destruction of 50-60 percent of the an
opposing force's air assets and this was to be accomplished
within 24-36 hours. After such time, control of frontal
aviation assets will be returned to frontal commanders to
provide support for ground operations. 79 The initial air
operation in the Western Theater of Military Action (WTVD) was
expected to encompass a depth of 1,000-1,200 km and a width of
800-1000 km. 80 An essential element in the successful
conduct of this operation was deemed to be successful
penetration of the NATO integrated air defense system. The
suppression of ground-based air defenses in several
breakthrough corridors, supplemented by heavy use of
electronic warfare, was considered vital to the success of the
operation. 81
The concept of the air operation employs traditional
elements of Russian combined-arms thinking. In addition to
the use of Long-Range and Frontal Aviation, attacks by Rocket
Troops of the ground forces, using missiles with improved
conventional munitions warheads, played a vital role in








envisioned was the use of artillery, attack helicopters,
airborne and special forces troops. 82
The concept of the air offensive with its emphasis on
centralized control of air assets and combined arms employment
shows a remarkable doctrinal continuity in Soviet air warfare
theory married with the greatly increased effectiveness of
modern airpower.
D. OGARKOV AND THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
In the early 1980 's, it was realized by some visionaries
in the Soviet military that another Revolution in Military
Affairs was occurring, caused by the integration of the
computer into all facets of warfare and by the development of
precision-guided weaponry. There was an emerging view that
conventional weaponry was acquiring a destructive power equal
to that of nuclear weapons . According to Marshal of the
Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov, then Chief of the General Staff,
...rapid changes in the development of conventional means
of destruction and the emergence in the developed
countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike
complexes, long-range high accuracy terminally guided
combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and
qualitatively new electronic control systems makes many
types of weapons global and makes it possible to sharply
increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the
destructive potential of conventional weapons . . . The
sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it
82 Petersen and Hines, 36-54
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possible to immediately extend combat operations not just
to border regions, but to a whole country's territory,
which was possible in past wars. 83
The increasing scope of operations of modern weapon
systems required taking a new view of looking at the conduct
of combined arms operations. Front-level strike means,
especially missiles and aircraft, had the ability to act in
such depth that the concept of front-level operations was
becoming outmoded. Ogarkov stated that the basic combat
operation in future war would be the theater-level operation,
not the frontal operation. 84
These new concepts had significant ramifications for
Soviet airpower theory. Ogarkov noted that, "the air domain,
which gives modern operations its three-dimensional character
and depth, is assuming an ever increasing role in combat
actions and operations." 85 In 1981, Long-Range Aviation was
reorganized into five Air Armies of the Soviet Union, and
tailored to specific theater requirements. These Air Armies
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were believed to be subordinated to Stavka control during
wartime to allow for centralized control of the deep strike
mission in Theaters of Military Operations. 86
Even more significant than the increasing scope of
operations was the essential change in the nature of warfare
itself. The dominant weapon system on the future battlefield
was expected to be the reconnaissance-strike complex. These
systems have the capability for "the faultless selection and
the rapid engagement of targets at any depth on the first
strike." 87 Examples of such systems under development by the
United States include the operational-level PLSS (Precision
Location Strike System) , designed for the suppression of enemy
air defenses, and the tactical-level JTACMS (Joint Attack
Missile System) , intended primarily to counter second echelon
armored forces. 88
The functional components of a recce-strike complex
include both a means of detection and a means of attack linked
by advanced automated control links. In most recce-strike
systems, airborne elements conduct the detection and targeting
function. For example, PLSS uses ten TR-1 reconnaissance
86 Mason and Taylor, 141
87 Mar Avn N. M. Skomorokhov, "Reconnaissance-Strike (Weapon) Complexes"




aircraft, of which three are on station at one time. These
aircraft are assessed to be able to target hostile air defense
systems within 30 seconds of emission with an accuracy of 15-
30 meters to a total depth of 500 kilometers. Information is
relayed to a ground control center and passed to F-16
aircraft, which comprise the strike element of the system.
The system is regarded as a grave threat to the combat
stability of air defense forces. 89
These revolutionary weapons systems were expected to
fundamentally alter the nature of conflict, with the massing
of firepower replacing the massing of maneuver forces. A
vision of future warfare between such systems is provided by
Colonel Yu. Molostov and Major A. Novikov in a 1988 article in
Soviet Military Review ;
Each side in battle will strive for firepower superiority.
This aspiration will inevitably assume the form of a duel,
frequently from maximum distances. The duel will be won
by the side which organized reconnaissance better,
outwitting the adversary in fighting technique,
maneuvering quickly and more skillfully, and destroying
enemy installations the first time out. Speed will
therefore be vital, as well as knowledge of enemy strong
and weak points and a creative approach to fire




Col Yu. Molostov and A. Novikov, "High-Precision Weapons Against Tanks",
Soviet Military Review, No. 1, Jan 1988, 12-13, as cited in "The Soviet Strategic View",
Strategic Review, Winter 1988, 81
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B. CONCLUSION
The development of Russian air doctrine has displayed a
tremendous continuity since its inception. Prior to the new
Revolution in Military Affairs, the increasing capabilities of
modern weaponry had not changed the fundamental concepts of
the necessity for air superiority and the use of airpower in
a combined arms role in support of strategic objectives in a
conventional war scenario. Douhet ' s concept of victory
through the use of airpower (in this case, strategic nuclear
means) alone was not fully accepted in Russian doctrine. The
nuclear missile was viewed as long-range artillery which could
strike independently in the enemy's deep rear but its purpose
was to create conditions for the ultimate success of the the
general purpose forces. However, the concepts of air
superiority meant little because of the inability to
effectively intercept these systems. Warfare would be reduced
to a series of overwhelming offensive strikes.
The increasing conventional strike potential of aviation
and ground forces missile troops enabled them to fulfill the
role previously assigned to nuclear weapons. The development
of such systems as recce-strike complexes and precision-guided
weaponry has accelerated the trend towards warfare being waged
primarily with "fire strikes" rather than contact between
forces. The question exists whether the new paradigm for the
49
use of high-precision strike forces will be developed from
existing concepts of conventional air warfare employment f such
as the air offensive , or will it be taken from concepts of
nuclear weapons employment.
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IV. RUSSIAN LESSORS OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: AIRPOWER AND
THE HEW MILITARY-TECHHICAL REVOLUTION
The Persian Gulf War seemed to represent a change in the
fundamental nature of warfare . Marshal Ogarkov ' s concept of
a revolution in military affairs appears in the light of
Operation Desert Storm to be highly prophetic. This chapter
will examine the lessons of the Gulf War with respect to the
concept of warfare by "remote strikes." Of particular
importance is the question of whether a paradigm shift has
occurred in which aerospace striking power embodied in
precision-guided weaponry and reconnaissance-strike complexes
have supplanted massed ground forces as the dominant force on
the battlefield.
A. THE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRPOWER
On 16 January 1991, Coalition forces began a six-week air
campaign in support of Operation Desert Storm. The air
campaign provided a unique chance to examine the stand-alone
effectiveness of airpower on the modern battlefield. This
application of airpower proved to be very effective compared
with previous uses of airpower. During the campaign, the
Coalition was able to "to win absolute supremacy in the air,
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to disrupt the leadership of the country and troops
,
[and] to
disable more than 70% of the military-industrial
facilities." 91 The input measures of the Coalition Air
Campaign were equally impressive to Russian observers. Over
110,000 sorties were generated in the course of the war (six-
weeks) and an estimated 88,000 tons of ordnance were employed.
In contrast, an average of only 17,000 sorties a month were
generated in 1966 during the war in Vietnam. 92
1. The Role of Ailpower
While the effectiveness of airpower was convincingly
displayed in the Gulf War, the question exists of whether it
was independently decisive or merely a constituent element in
a combined arms warfare in accordance with traditional Russian
military thought.
Some Russians saw the Gulf air campaign as an analog
to the traditional concept of the independent air operation
which had existed since the 1930' s. Lieutenant General
Malyutkov, Air Force Chief of Staff, spoke of the Gulf air war
in such a light. The air war, in his opinion, was a
91 Col G. Vasiliev, "The Concluding Phase of Desert Storm", Zarubezhnoye Voennove
Obozreniye. No.4 April 1991, 7-11 (JPRS-UFM-92-001-L, 10 March 1992, 6)
92 Col Yu. G. Sizov and Col A. L. Skokov, "The Significance of Precision Weapons in
Modern Warfare", Voennava Musi. No 12, Dec 92, 37-42 (JPRS-UMT-93-003-L, 7 Apr 1993,
23)
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"classical air offensive" in which air power "took care of
almost all the main tasks." However, he did not view this as
an affirmation of Douhet's theories on airpower. According
to Malyutkov, airpower was a powerful tool which worked within
the context of the classical combined arms operation; the
nature of the target set demonstrated this fact.
Primary efforts of multinational forces
aviation were directed above all at weakening
Iraqi force groupings and creating favorable
conditions for conducting an offensive
operation by ground and naval forces, and not
at achieving the goals of the war directly by
independent air operations. 93
In fact, General Malyutkov viewed the strategic attacks
conducted against Iraqi military-industrial and administrative
centers as a dispersion of effort which contributed little to
the outcome of the conflict and reduced the overall
effectiveness of the initial air offensive. 94 Colonel A. N.
Ionov also mentioned that the destruction of military-
industrial and administrative targets required a large portion
of available airpower and noted that their destruction "was
93 Col V. P. Chigak, "The First Lessons of the Gulf War," Voennava Mvsl. No 5, May




not dictated by situational conditions." 95 He also stated
that the current Russian concept of airpower employment
differs from that used by the Coalition in that Russian
doctrine links air operations more closely to ground force
missions. 96
I. M. Maltsev, Chief of the Main Staff for Air Defense
Forces, was also a supporter of the traditional model. He
noted that Douhet ' s theory may apply to small scale wars, such
as the Six-Day War or the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee in
Lebanon, but in larger scale conflicts all types of forces are
necessary. He pointed to the fact that the Coalition movement
of large ground and naval forces to the Gulf demonstrates that
the Multi-National Coalition too could not fully accept
Douhet 's theory.
He, like General Malyutkov, also described the role of
aerospace forces within the traditional context:
... [the] role of offensive aerospace forces
will constantly grow in continental TVD's
using ground, air and naval forces. But
evidently the entire scope of missions will
not be able to be accomplished just by them.
As a rule, success in warfare is achieved
95 Col A. N. Ionov, "Some Lessons of a Small War," Voennaya Musi, No 3, Mar 1992,




through joint efforts of all branches of the
armed forces. 97
However, the tremendous effectiveness of airpower in
the Gulf led others to reject the traditional combined arms
concept as rendered obsolete by the military technical
revolution. According to some Russian observers, the Gulf War
instead validated the thesis that airpower can now by itself
win a war. For example, Major General I. N. Vorobyev stated
in a Voennaya Mysl article that airpower alone could be
victorious in future conflict.
One of the characteristic features of a
technological war is that the goal of
operations conducted in it can be achieved
under certain conditions without ground troops
ever invading enemy territory
—
just by
conducting an electronic- fire engagement. 98
Such views were echoed by other military analysts as
well. Major General Vladimir I. Slipchenko, who was a
professor at the General Staff Academy and had studied the
problem of the nature of future war at the Academy ' s
Operational-Strategic Center, attempted to distance the





For a very long time we focused on a
stereotype; the enemy, at the very onset of a
war, after a three to five day offensive air
operation, would have to invade with ground
forces, and that the ground forces invasion
would itself be considered the main element of
the war. But now it turns out that it is
possible not to do that at all. Having at its
disposal enormous means of air attack, in the
main unmanned, the probable enemy can begin
and conduct purely an air war."
Thus, two very different views of airpower's role in
future conflict were developed as a result of the Gulf War.
To assess which view is more correct, an analysis of both
emerging technology and the changing nature of warfare
is necessary.
B. HEN OFFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY AND POTENTIAL COUHTERMEASURES
The Gulf War saw the introduction of several revolutionary
military technologies for offensive air warfare which have
caused a considerable impact on Russian military thinkers.
Among these are stealth technology, precision-guided weaponry
and reconnaissance-strike complexes.
1. Stealth Technology
The introduction of stealth technology has created a
fundamental change in the conduct of offensive air operations.
99 Major General V. I. Slipchenko, "Impending Changes From the Reform Plan for
Employing the Soviet Armed Forces," Manuscript [in English] of Presentation at the
National Defense University, Washington D.C., March 15 and 20, 1991, 11-12
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Now, one can strike at the heart of an opponent without having
air superiority in the traditional sense. This was
demonstrated in the opening hours of Desert Storm when F-117's
struck with impunity very heavily-defended targets and
suffered no losses.
The ability of stealth aircraft to penetrate
sophisticated air defense systems essentially means a return
to Douhet's concept that the bomber will always get
through. 100 Moreover, the ability to strike with precision-
guided weaponry can inflict damage unattainable in the past.
The Russians view stealth aircraft as a very
significant threat in spite of a general tendency to downplay
its effectiveness. Russian sources noted that while F-117's
comprised only five percent of the strike aircraft sorties in
the first 24 hours, they were able to destroy over one-third
of the assigned strategic target set without loss. 101
General Malyutkov noted that while stealth technology "has
opened a new direction in aircraft development", the F-117
would "not have been able to roam so freely" in a European war
scenario with rugged terrain and advanced air defenses and
100 Maj Kevin J. Kennedy, "Stealth: A Revolutionary Change in Air Warfare," Naval
War College Review, Spring 1993, 121
101 Viktor Bakurskiy and Vladimir Ilin, "Persian Gulf Air War", Kryla Rodiny, No 12,
Dec 1991, 25-27 (JPRS-UMA-92-004-L, 8 July 1992, 9)
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countermeasures . He further noted that financial difficulties
will limit research in this area, and although stealth will be
considered in designing future combat aircraft, no special
aircraft designed specifically to incorporate stealth to the
exclusion of more traditional requirements will be
developed. 102
For these reasons, the Russian counter to stealth
aircraft will likely be an asymmetric response. Firstly,
there is a belief that current second-generation, surface-to-
air missile systems can have some capability against stealth
aircraft. Effectiveness depends on tactical measures such as
attacking stealth aircraft from above and the use of a variety
of different homing systems such as infra-red, passive and
active radar. The integration of these systems with area
search electro-optic sensors may be useful in solving the
detection problem. 103
More esoteric means of detection and destruction are
also being considered. These include airborne and spaceborne
systems, including the use of dirigibles, and multi-frequency
and over-the-horizon radar systems. Of particular interest is
102 Dmitriy Grinyuk and Petr Butovski, "Chief of Air Force Staff Interviewed," Kryla
Rodiny, No 11, Nov 1991, pp Cl-2 (JPRS-UMA-92-014, 22 Apr 1992, 7)
103 Lt Gen V. Malanichenko, "Stealth Threat to Air Defense, Part II", Vestnik
Protivovozdushnoy Oborony. No.l, Jan 1992, 47-49 (JPRS-UMA-92-014, 22 Apr 1992, 11-12
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a loitering cruise missile-like surface-to-air missile,
similar in concept to the abortive TACIT RAINBOW anti-
radiation missile. This system would cruise under inertial
guidance in a patrol area, using infra-red sensors for
terminal guidance. 104
The question remains as to whether these measures will
mean a return to the status quo ante and which will relegate
stealth to the just another evolutionary development in the
history of radar counter-measures or whether, as with the
submarine, stealth will be relatively unaffected by attempts
at countermeasures
.
2. The Reconnaissance-Strike Complex
According to the Russians, the Gulf War saw the first
use of the reconnaissance-strike complex in battle. The E-8
JSTARS battlefield surveillance aircraft, operating with Army
MLRS multiple rocket launchers and ATACMS battlefield
missiles, represented the fulfillment of Okarkov's conception
of a reconnaissance-strike complex as they reduced greatly the
time between detection and destruction of highly mobile
targets operating well behind the front line. 105 A single





square kilometers of territory and accurately distinguish
classes of ground vehicles and helicopters. 106 The
development of highly capable airborne platforms that can
track both air and ground targets at great distances are a
crucial element in the conduct of this new type of war.
The question of defense against the recce-strike
complex is an issue which has received a great deal of
attention in the Russian military press . The critical element
of vulnerability in such systems is assessed to be the
airborne component of the system. During the Gulf War, it was
noted that 2-3 RC-135, 3-6 TR-1, 4-6 E-3A, 2-4 E-2C and 1-2 E-
8 JSTARS aircraft were constantly on alert in the war
zone. 107 The most effective counter to such a system is
assessed to be free roving fighters and mobile long-range
surface-to-air missiles against the air platforms. The
ground-based elements are considered to require more assets
for destruction and entail heavier losses. It is estimated
that the incapacitation of the recce-strike system for one
hour (the time needed to replace the destroyed high value air
assets) would require up to six fighters per target and
106 V. Dubrov, "MNF Direct Air Support in Desert Sword Operation Reviewed",
Aviatsia i Kosmonavtika. No 11, Nov 91, 26-27 (JPRS-UAC-92-006, 22 June 1992, 20)
107 Skoromkov, 12
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overall friendly fighter losses could be as high as 20
percent. One author recommends the development of specially-
trained fighter units consisting of highly experienced pilots
who can operate autonomously for the destruction of these
platforms. Continuous pressure is to be applied until the
systems are rendered completely combat ineffective. 108 It is
obvious that the destruction of these platforms will be one of
the highest priorities in a future conflict.
3. High-Precision Weaponry
Another revolutionary aspect of the Gulf war was the
use of precision weaponry on a scale not seen in earlier local
wars. Colonel John Warden, a principle architect of the air
campaign concept that was used against against Iraq, summed up
the revolutionary nature of these new weapon systems by
stating that the Gulf War " . . .was the very first war in which
single airplanes were able to fly to their targets and
accomplish, what in the past, could not have been accomplished
at all or would have taken literally thousands of airplanes to
accomplish. " 109
The conventional land-attack cruise missile played an




"Can Bombing Win A War?," Nova Show No 2002, 19 Jan 1993, Journal Graphics
Transcript, 1
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were extremely impressed by its long-range, relative
invulnerability to countermeasures, and pinpoint accuracy of
these missiles, crediting them with an accuracy rate of over
80 percent and a circular error probability of as little as
three meters. 110
Russian military experts have given consideration to
both active and passive defenses against high-precision
weaponry. The latest Russian surface-to-air missile systems
are touted in the Russian military press as having capability
against such systems. Emphasis is placed on long-range,
second-generation air defense systems such as the SA-10 which
can destroy tactical missiles and aircraft in flight before
weapon release. 111 However, some newer systems, such as the
SA-15 Tor, have the capability to intercept not only aircraft
but guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and unmanned air
vehicles. 112
Passive measures also are deemed to have great utility
in combating high-precision weaponry. Indeed, this is one of
the few areas where Iraq achieved success during the war.
110 Capt 1st Rank Kzheb, "Early Analysis of the Naval Role in the Gulf," Morskoy
Sbornik. No 2, Feb 1991, 59-63 (JPRS-UMA-91-015, 21 June 1991, 64)
111 Col Yu. Sizov and Col A. L. Skokov, Significant of Precision Weapons in Modern
Warfare", Voennaya Musi No 12, Dec 1992, 37-42 (JPRS-UMT-93-003-L, 7 Apr 1993, 23)
112 Col. Anatoliy Dokuchayev, Performance, Specification of 'Tor' Air Defense Missile
System," Krasnaya Zvezda. 23 Dec 1992, 2 (JPRS-UMA-93-006, 24 Feb 1993, 23-24)
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Russian sources credit Iraq with waging an effective campaign
of camouflage, concealment and deception, using hundreds of
fiberglass mock-ups of combat aircraft and missile launchers.
They go so far as to say that up to fifty percent of initial
coalition airstrikes fell on false targets. 113 While the
Russians may be overstating the case, elements of the Iraqi
deception campaign were also noted by Western analysts. Barry
Watts, an author of the Gulf War Air Power Survey , also points
to elements of this extensive Iraqi effort. For example, the
nuclear fuel of the Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Power Plant was taken
from the reactor and placed in a field and covered with dirt,
rendering this vital element invisible to Coalition means of
detection. 114 The degree of Russian interest in the use of
maskirovka (camouflage, concealment and deception) as noted in
professional military articles would tend to indicate that
much effort will be placed on passive means of defense against
these systems.
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTANGIBLES
The Gulf War not only highlighted a dazzling array of
modern technology but demonstrated the necessity for both
113 Col V. P. Chigak, "The First Lessons of the War," Voennava Mvsl, No 5, May 1991,
60-71, as translated in JPRS-UMT-92-002-L, 16 Jan 1992, 37
114 Barry D. Watts, "17 February 1993 SAIS [School of Advanced International Studies]
Seminar on the 'Revolution in Military Affairs/" 10
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effective training and support for the successful conduct of
offensive air operations as well as the importance of
qualitative over quantitative superiority.
Traditionally, the Russians have emphasized combat
capabilities over support systems. However, modern aircraft
are only a portion of the overall combat system which includes
logistic and maintenance support, and communications and
intelligence capabilities. According to General Malyutkov:
What we need is an optimum correlation between
combat and backup means. As the experience of
the war has shown, the main NATO armed forces
have solved this problem. In our country, the
trend towards priority development of combat
hardware, of its visible combat potential,
unfortunately has persisted for a long time,
while operational and material and technical
backup has remained in the background. 115
The serious deficiencies in Russian aircrew training took
on a disconcerting light in the wake of the coalition air
offensive. Due to such factors as an overabundance of flight
personnel and increasingly serious maintenance difficulties,
average annual flight time for Russian pilots is now a third
to a quarter what it is in the United States. 116
115 Capt S. Sidorov, "Air Force Chief of Staff on Gulf War Lessons," Krasnaua Zvezda,
14 Mar 1991, 1st ed„ 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-053, 19 Mar 1991, 51)
116
"Air Force Deputy CinC on Gulf War, Combat Training Support," Aviatsiya i
Kosmonavtika, No 7, Jul 1991, 2-3 (JPRS-UAC-92-002, 3 Feb 1992, 2
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Against this backdrop, the capabilities of new equipment
and the changing nature of conflict require aircrew to be more
skilled. The previously mentioned use of free-roving fighters
to combat recce-strike complexes demands aircrew with both
experience and individual initiative.
These lessons dictate an increased emphasis on qualitative
superiority rather than the traditional Russian method of
quantitative superiority, in terms of sophistication of
hardware, support measures and training.
D. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR
In the minds of Russian military experts, the Gulf War
represents a watershed in the history of warfare. The
salient feature of modern high-technology warfare has become
the "fire strike." The concept of the fire strike as a
decisive means of combat has its origins in theories of
nuclear warfare. However, as precision conventional weaponry
increased in effectiveness, the concept was broadened to
encompass them as well. Colonel V. V. Krysanov, writing in
Voennava Mysl
. describes the nature of the conventional fire
strike:
The first strike, which in nuclear war is
capable of determining the outcome, should be
singled out in particular. With conventional
weapons it can also be the chief factor
determining success of further military
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operations... as a rule, it is a powerful
preemptive fire strike with mass employment of
missiles, aircraft, missiles, reconnaissance-
strike complexes, artillery, [and] electronic
warfare equipment. 117
I. N. Vorobyev noted that, unlike past wars, it was not
the infantry and tank formations which determined the outcome
of the conflict but strategic and operational use of air and
missile assets in an "electronic-fire engagement." 118
1. The Blurring of Traditional Concepts
The ability to wage a long-range "remote" battle has
led to a situation where traditional military concepts are
becoming less applicable in future conflict. Instead of being
able to view conflict as a series of discreet spheres such as
air, naval or land, the degree of mutual interaction among
remote strike forces requires that the battle space be viewed
as a three-dimensional continuum, with both space and the
electromagnetic spectrum as integral components. 119
Similarly, concepts of tactical, operational and
strategic levels of war are becoming less distinct as the
capability to strike effectively from the front to the deep
117 Col. V. V. Krysanov, "Features of the Development of Forms of Military
Operations," Voennaya Mysl. No. 2, Feb 1992, 42-45 (JPRS-UMT-92^007-L, 5 June 1992, 24)




strategic rear becomes a reality. According to General
Slipchenko, concepts of front and rear will be replaced by the
concepts of "subject to attack" and "not subject to attack" as
the entire depth of the rear becomes an area of conflict. 120
2. The Information War and Counter-targeting
The increasing range and destructive power of strike
warfare systems has placed increasing demands on intelligence
and detection capabilities. Barry Watts notes that the means
of destruction have outpaced both the means of command and
control and detection capabilities. "If we know where to
aim, we can hit. But knowing where to aim remains
difficult." 121 The ability to provide timely targeting data
for military targets and identify critical components of
economic target sets now comprise the limiting factor in the
overall effectiveness of strike warfare.
The implications for intelligence of this "partial
revolution" in which weapon range and capability outstrip the
means of detection is certainly profound. Col A. N.
Zakharov, writing on the subject of the nature of future war
in the Russian journal Voennaya Mysl , describes this concept:
120 Slipchenko, "Impending Changes", 16
121 Watts, 11
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The... trend is dictated by the ever growing
significance of information collected in a
timely manner on the target of effect to
ensure requisite weapon effectiveness. It
signifies that achieving success in operations
will largely depend on the effectiveness of
combating reconnaissance and information
systems... in planning the enemy's defeat
commanding generals and staffs must initially
give priority to personnel and equipment
employed for collection, transmission
,
processing and storage of information, then to
personnel and equipment employed for
redistributing it and combat equipment of
command and control facilities; and only then
to weapons. 122
The result of this shift is the increasing necessity
to rely on countertargeting strategies such as maskirovka and
mobility. It was noted that only Iraqi forces which were
mobile had any measure of survivability or effectiveness. 123
The most famous example of these being the difficulty in
detecting the Iraqi force of mobile "SCUD" ballistic missiles.
While the fixed missiles and command and control sites of the
Iraqi Missile Troops were quickly destroyed by the coalition
air offensive during the first week, the effort against mobile
122Col A. N. Zakharov, "Trends in the Development of Warfare", Voennaua Musi No.
11-12, December 1991, 9-15 (JPRS-UMT-92-005-L, 23 Mar 1992, 8)
123 General-Major Yu. V. Lebedev, "Persian Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions,"
Voennava Mysl. No. 11-12, December 1991, 109-117 QPRS-UMT-92-005-L, 23 Mar 1993, 63)
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launchers only achieved partial success after a tremendous
expenditure of effort. 124
In contrast, even hardened fixed sites were proven
vulnerable to attack. Like the Iraqis, the Russians had
placed considerable emphasis on airfield survivability,
including hardened aircraft shelters and easily repairable
airfields. The lack of Israeli effectiveness in striking Arab
airfields during the Yom Kippur war indicated that these were
very effective countermeasures . However, the successful
Coalition campaign against the hardened shelters proved
otherwise, forcing the Iraqis to attempt to disperse their
aircraft in small groups and move them frequently to avoid
destruction in a classic countertargeting scheme. 125
Subsequent Russian commentary highlights the
vulnerability of even hardened air bases to advanced
conventional munitions. One potential solution is vertical
take-off aircraft, such as the YAK-141, which have the ability
to operate away from easily targeted airfields. 126
124 Col A. Manachinskiy and Col V. Chumak, "Tactical Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense'"
Voyennw Vestnik. No 12, 1991, 66-69 (JPRS-UMA-92-001-L, 16 Mar 1992, 38)
125 Christopher M. Centner, "Ignorance is Risk The Big Lesson from the Desert Storm
Air Base Attacks," Airpower Tournal, Winter 1992, 31-32
126 Col P. Lisitskiy, "Support For VTOL YAK-141 Linked to Gulf War," Krasnaya
Zvezda. 6 Dec 1992, 1st ed., 2 (JPMS-UMA-91-032, 17 Dec 1991, 40)
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The necessity for a countertargeting strategy has also
led to the concept of a non-linear battlefield. The
effectiveness of such systems as reconnaissance-strike
complexes is such that, according to Russian estimates, a
division-sized second echelon force could be destroyed in a
matter of several hours. 127 Therefore, concepts of linear
warfare based on breakthrough and exploitation will be
difficult to implement. Instead, the concept of using small,
autonomous and highly mobile groups is becoming the paradigm
for future war. 128 The vital "center of gravity" of a
hostile force is now likely to be not ground force groupings
but nuclear and conventional strike elements, command and
control, and means of air defense and electronic warfare.
Therefore, deep penetration forces are necessary to find and
destroy these systems. 129 All these factors lead to a fluid,
dynamic battlefield which increasingly resembles the
traditional concepts of naval warfare in its decisiveness,
non-linearity and the importance of counter detection
strategies.
127 Skomorokhov, 14




3. THE PRIMACY OF OFFENSE
The conduct of the offensive air campaign in the Gulf
War has led to many observers commenting that offensive means
have outstripped the means of defense. General Major Yu. V.
Lebedev, writing in Voennaya Mysl , makes the following
observation:
On the whole, the war showed that conventional
offensive weapons surpass defensive weapons
with the present technological level... A
defense incapable of creating necessary
conditions for launching a decisive offensive
will not fulfill its mission and will not lead
to success in defending the homeland. 130
Colonel Zakharov echoes this view by noting the
increasing numbers of deep strike conventional weaponry,
including B-2 bombers, sea-launched cruise missiles and
reconnaissance-strike complexes which can attack with little
or no warning. Such a strike could be so destructive as to
have an irreversible nature for the course of the war. The
only viable option for success in conflict would be a
preemptive attack. 131 Clearly, this represents a distinct
shift away from the traditional view that airpower is a tool
of attritional warfare. Unlike the Red Air Force after
130 Lebedev, 63
131 Zakharov, Trends in the Development Of Warfare", 8
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Operation Barbarossa, the current Russian military would not
be able to recover from a surprise attack.
However, there is reason to believe that a view of
future war as totally offense dominant may be overly
deterministic. In this regard, the unique factors of the Gulf
War and the technological surprise of so many new forms of
warfare being employed may provide lessons which are not
broadly applicable for future conflict. Specifically, the
destruction of the Iraqi integrated air defense system was
greatly facilitated by overwhelming quantitative and
qualitative superiority, especially in means of electronic
warfare. Many of the air defense systems used by the Iraqis
were of an older generation, which the Coalition was easily
able to defeat electronically. 132
While there is consensus that offensive systems have
an inherent advantage in strike warfare, the Russian military
is attempting to grapple with the threat posed by air
offensive weapons. Parallels between nuclear and high-
technology conventional weapons may be overdrawn with respect
to the dynamics between offense and defense. Sizov and
Skokov noted the following, "In contrast to nuclear weapons,
132 Col O. Falichev, "Shilka Versus B-52," Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 Apr 1992, 4 (FASTC-
2660P-92, Spring 1992, 53)
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precision weapons and measures of combating them are based on
original engineering solutions." 133
Mathematical modeling of engagements of suppression
and strike packages against air defense systems indicates that
a dramatic increase in air defense survivability can be
accomplished by measures such as increased mobility,
deception, (likely including false emitters as anti-radiation
missile targets), reduction in emissions and defensive




Much effort is also being placed on active defense
against offensive air weapons. That the Russians see promise
in the concept of defense against offensive air weapons,
including ballistic missiles, is underscored by a recent
exercise at the Emba Test Range. In the test, simulated
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submunitions dispensers
and salvo-fire rockets were engaged by various air defense
systems (SA-8, SA-10, SA-12, SA-15) in an electronic
counter-measures environment. The results were encouraging,
with most targets being destroyed with a single missile.
Overall, it required 64 missiles total to destroy the 34
133 Sizov and Skokov, 26
134 Sizov and Skokov, 24-25
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targets, all of which were successfully engaged in the air.
The Russians noted that overall accuracy was much higher than
the PATRIOT missile system displayed in the anti-tactical
ballistic missile role in the Gulf War. 135
Taken together, these developments indicate that the
view of the future war as offense dominant based on the
Coalition offensive air operation against Iraq may be somewhat
misleading.
What does seem clear, however, is that the battle
between air offense and defense will likely decide the course
of future high intensity conventional conflict and that the
failure to effectively defend against modern air offensive
weaponry could lead to disaster. Ground forces, therefore,
must have highly effective air defense systems to survive on
the modern battlefield. 136 However, air defense systems
alone are not viewed as capable of defeating modern air
offensive weapons and the combined efforts of all forces are
necessary to destroy hostile strike forces, including
retaliatory offensive strikes. 137 This means that modern
135 Viktor Litovkin, "New Priorities for Ground Forces Air Defense," Izvestiya, 23 Oct
1992, Morning ed., 1-2 (JPRS-UMA-92-040, 11 Nov 1992, 17)
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war, in which strike weapons are widely used, must by
necessity take on an offensive character.
E. CONCLUSION
There is widespread acceptance among Russian observers
that airpower is now increasingly a determining factor in the
course and outcome of conflict. However, there has been mixed
opinions on whether airpower can independently achieve
strategic goals in a conflict.
The Coalition introduction of such weapons as
reconnaissance-strike complexes, stealth aircraft and
precision-guided weaponry demonstrated a great advance in
warfare capability. Russia is currently placing much emphasis
on developing ways to combat these systems, many times with
asymmetric responses as well as, in some cases, fielding
analogous capabilities.
The military technical revolution has profoundly altered
the nature of the modern war. The ability of space and
airborne sensors to provide a view of the battlefield into the
strategic depth of the rear and the ability of long range
precision weapons to effectively strike detected forces has
caused revolutionary change on the modern battlefield. Now
emphasis is placed on mobility and deception for survival as
any detection can be swiftly translated into destruction. The
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future ground battlefield will no longer have front lines as
any unit in prolonged contact with the enemy will likely be a
target for devastating strikes. Increasingly, high intensity
conventional conflict will be fought as a series of "fire
strikes", with contact ground forces playing a supporting
rather than a central role.
The nature of modern war also necessitates that offensive
strikes be conducted even when on the strategic defensive, as
defensive means alone cannot be effective. Thus, offensive
air operations must be an essential factor for future airpower
employment for Russia.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION FOR
OFFENSIVE AIR WARFARE THEORY
A. THE AEROSPACE WAR AND THE NEW VISIONARIES
In March 1991, Major General V. I. Slipchenko, a professor
at the Military Academy of the General Staff, gave a
presentation to the U.S. National Defense University on
factors affecting the Soviet Armed Forces. In this
presentation, he outlined the expected nature of future war.
Two factors greatly influenced this vision. The first was the
Persian Gulf War, which had then just concluded. The second
factor was the development of neutral Eastern Europe as a true
buffer between NATO and the Soviet Union. Slipchenko 's views,
however, are not necessarily mainstream or representative of
the eventual direction of Soviet Armed Forces development.
1 . Description
Slipchenko' s vision of future war is radical in that
he forcefully states that airpower alone can be the means of
victory. He describes the Persian Gulf air campaign as a
model for future war in which airpower alone will determine
the course and outcome. The war would include advanced forms
of weaponry such as orbital aircraft, ballistic missiles with
conventional warheads, unmanned air vehicles, cruise missiles,
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widespread use of stealth technology and directed energy
weapons. 138 According to Slipchenko, such a war would begin
by a massive conventional strike with "tens of thousands" of
cruise missiles which could destroy thousands of targets. 139
Much application of weaponry based on new physical principles
is envisioned, including particle beams and lasers. Space will
become not only an environment for reconnaissance but also for
conducting strikes. 140
Targets for such strikes would include economic sites
,
government and military command and control , lines of
communication and rear area supply and mobilization. However,
the first targets to be hit would be counterforce ones such as
airfields, missile launch facilities, naval bases and ground
forces command and control. 141
Slipchenko noted that such destructive striking power
will be able to accomplish not only operational-strategic









sharply reduced role, and victory may be possible without
occupation of the adversary nation. 142
Col I. V. Yerokhin, writing on military reform,, echoes
many of Slipchenko's views on the future nature of warfare and
future force requirements. He notes the following:
[T]he idea of warfare by invasion of ground
forces and its conduct in the frontier and
coastal areas to a depth of the front's
operational alignment must be replaced by
recognition of the global nature of war with a
preemptive air (electronic- fire) invasion to
the extent of the entire territory of the
enemy being attacked. 143
Yerokhin emphasizes the need for both effective defense
against air offensive weapons and means of retaliation that
are constantly combat ready. In contrast, general purpose
forces could be reduced and maintained in cadre units which
could be mobilized after the commencement of hostilities. 144
Related to the concept of aerospace war is the recent
proposal for a Strategic Non-Nuclear Force (SNNF) . Colonel
General A. A. Danilevich, in a recent Voennaya Mysi article,
describes the necessity for such a force. He notes that unlike
nuclear war, at least a temporary victory in a conventional
142
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war is possible and this makes it an attractive option for
hostile states. 145 Therefore, the need to deter not only
nuclear but conventional attacks is vital. The force
Danilevich envisions will not have the capability for
achieving victory in a conventional war, but may have a
deterrent effect by promising prompt retaliation for attacks
by high-technology conventional weapons. 146
A Strategic Non-Nuclear Force would be initially
composed of cruise missile carrying bomber aircraft, but later
could include both intercontinental and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. 147
Of the potential target sets, the most advantageous
according to Danilevich is estimated to be key installations
of military production and electrical power and petroleum
facilities, due to current limitations on weapon accuracy and
intelligence requirements, and the desire not to escalate to
nuclear war. 148
Another potential target set are those facilities that
can create a significant secondary effect. There is a great
145 Col Gen A. A. Danilevich, "On Strategic Non-Nuclear Deterrent Forces," Voennaya








concern , influenced by numerous man-made disasters, that the
use of high-precision conventional weaponry against dams,
nuclear power plants, chemical plants and other such
facilities could cause widespread destruction through
secondary effects. Candidate of Military Sciences L. Malyshev
states that conventional weapons can have an impact similar to
nuclear weapons by careful selection of the most vulnerable
targets. The author believes that by developing such a
targeting strategy with a force of high-precision conventional
weapons, the need for both large amounts of ground forces and
strategic nuclear forces would be eliminated. 149
Malyshev notes that such a strike occurred
unintentionally during the Gulf War. After a TOMAHAWK cruise
missile attack against a Baghdad biological warfare facility,
fifty guards at the plant reportedly died and a hundred more
were hospitalized from an unknown illness. 150
Malyshev points to the vulnerability of an
increasingly complex and interdependent industrial
infrastructure as an inevitable byproduct of a technologically
149
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advanced society, an achilles heel. 151 In this regard,
Malyshev parallels the views of airpower theorists such as
Algazin who advocated the destruction of critical bottlenecks
to cripple an enemy economy. Whether technology has caught up
with remains an open question.
2 . Analysis
A key factor regarding the Slipchenko's concept of
aerospace war is that it is derived as much from geostrategic
as from military-technical factors. Now, because of a truly
neutral Eastern Europe, it is almost impossible for NATO and
Russian forces to fight a large-scale ground war. In many
respects, the Russian geostrategic situation is much like that
of Italy after the First World War, and therefore it is not
surprising that Douhet's concept of air warfare developed with
regards to Italy's particular geostrategic position (i.e.
isolated from direct ground attack) would be advocated
currently in Russia. Institutional interests continue to point
to NATO as a threat, despite the collapse of communism. The
idea that airpower alone could determine the course and
outcome of a war means that a threat from NATO still exists,
however, in a very different context. Therefore, the concept




vision of war, but a concept which instead attempts to
perpetuate a traditional threat perception in light of
changing geostrategic factors.
The concept of the aerospace war resembles far more
closely previously developed concepts of nuclear war than it
does an extension of traditional airpower concepts such as the
air offensive. Slipchenko's conception seems to borrow much
from Sokolovskii ' s view of nuclear war.
The aerospace war has a target set which includes
strategic forces, command and control and military and
economic targets. 152 In fact, this target set is very similar
to the one which Sokolovskii describes for nuclear weapons in
the April 1963 edition of Soviet Military Strategy . According
to Sokolovskii, the objectives of a nuclear missile strike
would be destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack,
military and economic potential, and governmental and military
command and control. 153 The similarity is unmistakable.
Moreover, Slipchenko's concept of the blurring of offensive
and defensive methods of warfare and the concept of a nation's




expressed by Sokolovskii in the context of a nuclear
conflict. 154
Therefore, the aerospace war will most closely
resemble a nuclear war in character, but fought with
conventional weapons. The consequences of this are
significant. Slipchenko notes that strategy and operational
art will blend together as high-technology conventional
warfare is reduced to a series of strikes. According to
Slipchenko, the war could even be begin and end with a single
well-planned strike. 155 This brings to mind the U.S. concept
of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and implies
that such a targeting concept may now be applicable for
conventional weaponry as well as nuclear weaponry. Slipchenko
states that the Desert Storm Air Campaign is a prototype for
the future aerospace war. 156 It is important to note that the
Gulf War Air Campaign followed the methodology of strategic
targeting plans developed for war against the Soviet Union,
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However, proponents of aerospace war take the analogy
between precision-guided and nuclear weapons too far and are
attempting to reduce warfare to an engineering solution.
Slipchenko notes that destruction of 50 percent of vital
targets such as energy sources and lines of communication can
cripple the largest nation, and the nations "political system
will hardly survive. 158 In this regard, his concept
resembles those of bomber advocates in the 1930 's that V. V.
Khripin labeled "mechanistic visionaries."
The extrapolation of offensive capabilities without
consideration of the development of countermeasures and an
understanding of friction in war can lead to an unrealistic
view of future warfare. 159 The Gulf War has spurred the
development of countermeasures against such weaponry as
reconnaissance-strike complexes, high precision weaponry and
stealth technology. Mobility, deception and active measures
which may limit the effectiveness of these systems in future
war. The disastrous losses to the Soviet Long-Range bomber
force in the Spanish Civil War, Winter War and first stage of
158
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the Second Great Patriotic War were, in part, a result of
failing to understand that the duel between offensive and
defensive technology had rendered the heavy bomber far more
vulnerable than it had been a few years before.
Therefore , the concept of aerospace war, while
emphasizing trends that are vital to understand, overstates
the role of air striking power in future war. A vulnerable
economic center of gravity may simply not exist in many
potential conflicts. The effects of counter-measures such as
deception and mobility, as well as the inherent fog of war
itself, may reduce the effectiveness of the new generation of
precision weaponry. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
Russian military, while embracing the necessity of being able
to wage a "technological war" of deep strikes, does not pursue
a strategy solely dependent on them. On the basis of this, it
is likely that, for the foreseeable future, traditional
concepts of operational art for airpower employment will
continue to play a vital role in the conduct of air warfare.
B. THE 1992 DRAFT MILITARY DOCTRINE
In May 1992 , Russia published its first post-communist
military doctrine. The impact of the recent Persian Gulf War
was much in evidence in the documents discussion of potential
future war. The document has not yet been adopted and is
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currently still under debate. Nevertheless, it provides
critical insight into the effects of the military-technical
revolution. While the document acknowledges the decreasing
likelihood of a nuclear war, it notes that a large scale
conventional war could arise out of an escalating local
war. 160
In the initial period of conflict, an attack is now most
likely to come from the sea and air and not from the land.
This attack is describes as a mirror image of the Coalition
air campaign against Iraq. Such an attack will include air,
naval, air defense and highly-mobile ground units. Attacks by
precision-guided weaponry are expected on economic and
military targets. The doctrine states that ground forces may
be introduced in later stages of the conflict under heavy air
cover. However, whether this is evidence that the air
campaign can by itself achieve the goals of the war or whether
ground forces would simply not be committed following an
abortive air campaign is not clearly assessed. 161 However, a
shift in threat perception is notable. Colonel-General I. N.
Rodionov, in a Voennaya Mysl article on the draft doctrine,





military manpower , but in terms of air offensive weapons. 162
In response to such the threat, the draft military
doctrine describes a new set of military priorities. Emphasis
is to be placed on means of detection , means for combating
aircraft and missile attacks and systems for conducting
retaliatory attacks. 163 The doctrine is very specific about
the necessity to have an effective conventional offensive
strike capability:
In military-technical policy, in equipping the
forces, the highest priority is on emerging,
precision, mobile, highly survivable long-
range systems, which allow combat operations
to be made without making direct contact with
the enemy, as well as on weapons and
equipment, intelligence and command and
control of such quality to reduce
substantially the number of weapons while




The question remains, given the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the current economic crisis, whether the Russians
will be able to keep abreast of the rest of the world in these
cutting edge technologies. Major-General I. N. Vorobyev
162 Col Gen I. N. Radionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine", Voennava
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agrees with the necessity to try to field such systems , but
notes that the technological base cannot currently support
their development. 165
Perhaps because of uncertainty over the development of
such systems, the draft doctrine calls for nuclear retaliation
for conventional strikes against "strategic" targets, of which
examples such as Strategic Rocket Forces installations and
nuclear power plants are cited. 166
Nevertheless, a distinct shift towards conventional strike
capability at the expense of traditional forces is evident
from the document.
C. EVIDENCE OF SHIFTING PRIORITIES
Evidence of the shift to conventional precision strike
capability is emerging in both official statements and
deploying hardware. The Russian Air Force is drastically
cutting back on numbers but nevertheless seems to have an
impressive plan to develop a predominately offensive air
force. Ground and naval forces are also developing a precision
strike capability.
165
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The Air Force is planning to drastically change its
composition, emphasizing quality over quantity. Firstly, all
Su-17, MiG-23 and MiG-27 aircraft will be removed from service
and half will place in storage, the other half will be
destroyed. The MiG-29 and the Su-25 will be taken out of
production, while production of low levels of Su-24, Su-27 and
Tu-160 aircraft will continue. 167 Development of both a
follow-on to the Su-27, the Mikoyan 1-42, and a replacement
for the aging fleet of Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers is planned to
continue. 168 Emphasis will be placed on the development of
multiple versions of the long-range Su-27 fighter for command
and control, electronic warfare and deep strike. A new variant
of the Su-27 is capable of an unrefuelled range of 4,000 km
and a range of 6,500 km with in-flight refuelling. 169
The net result of these planned changes, if implemented,
will give a distinctly different character to the Russian Air
Force. It is essential to note that Air Force plans to keep in
production continue development of long-range deep strike and
escort aircraft while short-range fighters, such as the MiG-29
167
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and ground support aircraft such as the Su-25 are being taken
out of production. General Malyutkov estimates that if these
plans are accepted, the overall combat capability of the Air
Force will be 50 percent greater than before , despite the
drastic reduction in numbers. 170
Qualitative improvements in the ability of ground and
naval forces to conduct offensive strike warfare is also
evident. The Ground Forces have recently introduced a new
version of the SCUD operational-tactical missile, which
employs an optical sensor for pin-point guidance capability
and a submunition warhead. The SCUD, with a 300 km range, is
the longest-ranged ballistic missile that the Ground Forces
possess and is therefore a logical candidate for such an
upgrade. 171
Naval planners are attempting to increase the
effectiveness of naval forces in the engagement of land
targets. Recently, it was noted that the destroyer, which is
to be the backbone of future Russian Navy, will have the
170 Butowski, "Flying", 15
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ability to strike ground targets using missiles with
conventional warheads. 172
There are also indications of defensive weaponry being
developed which have significant capability in a war
characterized by remote strikes. In particular , the need to
destroy airborne elements of reconnaissance-strike complexes
has led to the development of weapon systems that can fill
this role. Recently, it was announced that Russia is
developing a 400 km range air-to-air missile which will be
carried by the Su-27. 173 Such a stand-off capability would
make destruction of high value air assets a much easier
prospect. Similarly, a new variant of the SA-10 surface-to-air
missile system is being developed which can engage aircraft
targets at up to 150 km range. 174
However, all the development programs currently under way
not achieve fruition unless the political leadership supports
them. In this regard, it is important to note that the Air
Force budget has not been finalized and the Air Force is
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attempting to help fund its modernization by sales of military
hardware abroad. 175
D. JOINT/COMBINED ARMS OR IHDEPENDEHT STRATEGY?
While the emphasis on development of the means for waging
strike warfare with high-technology precision weaponry is
evident, the question remains as to whether a revolutionary
independent airpower strategy as advocated by proponents of
aerospace war concept or an evolutionary employment of
airpower within a joint or combined arms framework will be the
appropriate model in future conflict. The official statement
of Russian Air Force roles, missions and composition which
appeared in the July 1992 Special Edition of Voennaya Mys1
would indicate the latter.
In this statement, the influence of the Persian Gulf War
is unmistakable. In particular, the concept of the air
campaign has been accepted as an element of future
warfare. 176 However, a tremendous continuity continues to
exist with previous concepts of operational art developed
before and during the Second Great Patriotic War.
The concept of the air campaign unites the features of the
previous air operation and anti-air operation into one
175 Butowski, 15
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operation. 177 However, the air campaign is developed within
the traditional concepts of joint and combined arms employment
and goals. The air campaign is viewed as prerequisite in order
for the Ground Troops to achieve success and is no mention of
airpower alone attaining victory. Moreover, the discussion of
operational and operational-strategic tasks for aviation
conducted in support of theater operations would indicate that
an independent strategy alone might not achieve the desired
result. 178 Nevertheless, an air campaign in which air
offensive weapons from all services are employed can be
considered an independent strategic operation. An appropriate
analogy here is Sokolovskii ' s view that the SRF was the force
which enabled ground forces to culminate victory by occupying
territory.
Another fundamental thread of continuity in Russian
offensive air theory since the 1930 's has been the use of all
arms to gain air superiority and wage the air offensive. As
the "spheres" of combat meld together in a three-dimensional
continuum, the need for joint action by all forces to
accomplish objectives is increasingly necessary. In this






arms operations seems to be more appropriate now than ever
before. The air campaign includes not only Air Force assets,
but also elements from other services as well operating as a
combined arms force. 179 Stated Air Force missions include the
gaining of air superiority and the engaging of the enemy in
the full depth of the operational rear. 180 The continuity
between present day missions and those of airpower theorists
such as Lapchinskiy and Mednis is striking. Despite tremendous
technological change, Russian concepts of operational art have
changed little.
The traditional concept of the Air Army continues to be
seen as an effective organizational structure which allows
massing of forces. However, balanced against centralization is
the need for decentralized control of airpower in certain
circumstances. 181 This becomes especially important on a non-
linear battlefield as smaller, highly mobile units require air
support. However, the down-attaching of air units will occur
only after the objectives of the air campaign are met. 182








Patriotic War with regards to flexibility of control, when
aircraft were massed under centralized control for air
operations, and then attached to lower levels to support
ground operations.
E. CONCLUSION
The military-technical revolution has caused a fundamental
change in the nature of warfare. The dominant form of warfare
is quickly becoming the "remote strike," replacing the
traditional Russian model based on massed tank and mechanized
armies. As a result of this, airpower is becoming the most
critical factor in determining the course and outcome of a
conventional war.
In fact, some theorists, such as Slipchenko, have gone so
far as to state airpower can now win wars independently, and
that Douhet's theory of air warfare can now be practically
achieved. However, such theories as the aerospace war provide
a mechanistic view of war which doesn't allow for fog and
friction. Extrapolating the current trends of warfare to their
logical conclusion fails to account for the duel between
weapons and counter-measures, and provides a view of warfare
which has proven inaccurate many times in the past. Unlike
nuclear weapons, conventional high-precision weapory are more
vulnerable to counter-measures and the effects of fog of war.
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Therefore, Russian planners have not embraced an independent
strategy which relies totally on them.
Therefore, despite futuristic visions such as the
aerospace war and an increasing appreciation of a strategic
role for airpower, the authoritative view is that airpower
cannot be relied upon to win a war by itself. The traditional
concepts of operational art for airpower employment remain
valid and are reflected in the current Air Force roles and
missions along with an emerging strategic role embodied in the
air campaign.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY
A. CONCLUSION
The primary objective of this thesis was to trace the
development of Russian offensive air warfare theory and to
determine whether the current Revolution in Military Affairs
will change the traditional Russian emphasis on airpower as
one element of a combined arms strategy.
The period between 1930 and 1945 saw the evolution of air
power theory from untested concepts to operational art proven
in the crucible of battle. However, Russian airpower theory
developed upon a significantly different path than Western
airpower concepts, driven by geostrategic factors,
technological shortcomings and the influence of the Stavka.
The Russian heavy bomber force, despite being the largest in
the world in the early 1930' s, did not subscribe to a concept
of independent strategic bombing along the lines advocated by
the Italian air theorist Douhet. Instead, a target set which
could most effectively influence the conduct of the ground war
was chosen.
During the late 1930 's, a shift towards tactical
employment of airpower became prominent as the heavy bomber
was proven increasingly vulnerable to defenses and
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technological progress stagnated. The fighter-bomber and
ground attack aircraft became the dominant element in Russian
air warfare theory. Air theorists such as Lapchinskiy and
Mednis defined new concepts of operational employment for
airpower which would prove a sound framework for a resurgent
Red Air Force. By emphasizing centralization of control and
combined arms operations, the Red Air Force waged a series of
highly effective air operations, gaining air superiority by
attrition and eventually dominating the three-dimensional
battlefield. However, because of a lack of an independent
strategy, the effectiveness of the Red Air Force in combined
arms operations is often underestimated. Given the tremendous
opportunity costs of building a strategic bombing force, the
Russian concept of air warfare as a combined arms element was
a cost effective alternative to an independent strategic
force
.
Following the end of the Second Great Patriotic War, the
new threat to the Soviet Union was no longer massed armored
forces, but nuclear attack. This drove Soviet air warfare
theory towards an emphasis on strategic offensive and
defensive capability. However, Douhet ' s concept of victory
through the independent use of airpower was not fully accepted
in Russian thought on nuclear war. The nuclear missile was
viewed as long-range artillery which could strike in the
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enemy's deep rear but its purpose was to create conditions for
success on the battlefield.
However, during the Khrushchev era, traditional concepts
of air warfare employment developed during the Second Great
Patriotic War seemed anachronistic. The concepts of air
superiority meant little because of the inability to
effectively intercept missile delivery systems. Warfare would
be reduced to a series of overwhelming offensive strikes.
However, the growing realization after Khrushchev's ouster
that there might be a initial conventional phase of a conflict
led to a reemergence of classical airpower concepts embodied
in the air offensive. The Six-Day War demonstrated
convincingly the strategic effectiveness of airpower in a
conventional war setting. The increasing conventional strike
potential of aviation and ground forces missile troops enabled
them to fulfill the role previously assigned to nuclear
weapons, especially the destruction of enemy strike means such
as nuclear weaponry and aviation assets. Thus, the trend
towards a duel of strike systems and away from the engagement
of traditional ground force elements in a conventional war was
being formulated as early as the 1960's.
The development of such systems as recce-strike complexes
and precision-guided weaponry has accelerated the trend
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towards warfare being waged primarily with "fire strikes"
rather than contact between forces.
Following the Persian Gulf War, there is widespread
acceptance among Russian observers that airpower is now
increasingly a determining factor in the course and outcome of
conflict, analagous to the ability of strategic nuclear forces
to effect the course and outcome of a nuclear war. However,
there has been mixed opinions on whether airpower can
independently achieve strategic goals in a conflict.
The Coalition introduction of such weapons as
reconnaissance-strike complexes, stealth aircraft and
precision-guided weaponry demonstrated such success in the
Persian Gulf War that many realized that the predicted
revolution in military affairs was occurring. Russia is
currently placing much emphasis on developing ways to combat
these systems, many times with asymmetric responses as well
as, in some cases, fielding analogous capabilities.
Another view for which there is great consensus is that
this current military technical revolution has profoundly
altered the nature of the modern war. The ability of space
and airborne sensors to provide a view of the battlefield into
the strategic depth of the rear and the ability of long range
precision weapons to effectively strike detected forces has
caused revolutionary change on the modern battlefield. Now
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emphasis is placed on mobility and deception for survival as
any detection can be swiftly translated into destruction. The
future ground battlefield will no longer have front lines as
any unit in prolonged contact with the enemy will likely be a
target for devastating strikes. Increasingly, high intensity
conventional conflict will be fought as a series of "fire
strikes
"
, with contact ground forces playing a supporting
rather than a central role.
The nature of modern war also necessitates that offensive
strikes be conducted even when on the strategic defensive, as
defensive means alone cannot be effective. Thus, offensive
air operations must be an essential factor for future airpower
employment for Russia.
As a result of the increased effectiveness of war by
"remote strikes"
, air striking power is becoming the most
critical factor in determining the course and outcome of a
war. In fact, some theorists such as Slipchenko have gone so
far as to state airpower can now win wars independently.
This has led to a vision of future war in which strategic
conventional strikes alone can bring victory, and that
Douhet's theory of air warfare can now be practically
achieved. However, such theories as the aerospace war provide
a mechanistic view of war which doesn't allow for fog and
friction of war. A conventional war which could be reduced to
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a series of strikes on the model of a nuclear conflict
extrapolates the trends of warfare to their logical
conclusion, but such a deterministic view of warfare also
fails to account for the development of countermeasures which
may reduce the effectiveness of the new generation of advanced
technology such as stealth, reconnaissance-strike complexes
and precision-guided weaponry.
Clearly, that airpower has an increasing role in modern
war was apparent in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. The 1992
Draft Military Doctrine shifts the emphasis to the means of
both high-precision conventional strike capability and air
defense from the old paradigm of massed ground forces. A
threat perception formerly expressed in numbers of tanks or
manpower is being replaced by the quantity of "offensive air
weapons." Moreover, there is recognition that, in modern
conflict, especially in the initial period of a war, the means
of offense have an inherent advantage over the means of
defense. Therefore, offensive air operations will be a
hallmark of any future high intensity conventional conflict.
The concept of the air campaign recently adopted combines both
defensive and offensive operation into one integrated
campaign
.
Such a campaign could be carried out as an independent
strategic operation, albiet with the assistance of ground and
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naval strike assets. The air campaign would not provide
victory itself but create the conditions for successful
exploitation by other forces, much in the same manner as
Sokolovskii ' s view of the role of strategic nuclear forces in
a nuclear war. In this regard, traditional Russian theory of
operational art for air warfare with its emphasis on theater
operations and combined arms has continued utility, despite a
distinct trend towards independent strategic employment of
airpower.
Concepts such as the aerospace war, with warfare reduced
to strategic strikes by high-precision conventional weapons,
appears at the present to be a vision for the future which has
little current impact on service roles and missions. However,
like Western airpower visionaries of the past, the current
aerospace war proponents play the role of iconoclasts in
shattering entrenched views and highlighting vital trends. In
Marxian logic, thinkers such as Slipchenko provide the anti-
thesis to the established thesis of massed armored forces
being the decisive force in modern war. From this, a new
synthesis has emerged on the role of airpower, combining new
concepts within a traditional framework.
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B. IMPLICATIONS: THE NAVT AND THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL
REVOLUTION
The military-technical revolution has significant
implications for the U.S. Navy, both in regards to the
evolution of threat capabilities and the changing nature of
warfare
.
Russia, despite the current economic situation, has placed
priority emphasis on the development of both means of high-
precision conventional strike capability and advanced means of
air defense. The Russian Air Force, despite downsizing, is
emphasizing the development of offensive air warfare potential
and is continuing the development of follow-on designs to both
the Tu-16 and Su-27 . In addition, deep strike and electronic
warfare variants of the Su-27 are being developed as well as
a new, highly sophisticated fighter variant.
The means of defense against offensive air weaponry are
also under intense development, spurred by the debacle the
Iraqis suffered in the Gulf War. Advanced air defense systems
such as the SA-10, 12 and 15 have demonstrated effectiveness
against simulated cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and
precision weaponry. Efforts are also underway to develop both
surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles which can engage the
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airborne elements of reconnaissance-strike complexes at stand-
off distances.
Taken together, these efforts show the determined nature
by which the Russians are grappling with the changes caused by
the military-technical revolution. If Russia does become a
resurgent global threat, as is considered a possibility in the
U.S. National Military Strategy , it may represent a greater
threat than during the Cold War from the standpoint of
conventional warfare capability.
While such a resurgent threat seems remote, even in the
context of a failure of democracy, the threat of these high-
technology weapons systems in regional conflict is very real.
Russia is financing the development of this new generation of
weaponry primarily by arms sales abroad. This trend of high-
technology precision weaponry sales will likely accelerate in
the future as the devaluation of the ruble fuels the need for
hard currency.
Because of this diffusion of technology to regional
actors, an understanding of the new vision of war caused by
the military-technical revolution is vital to the U.S. Navy
not just in a unlikely event of conflict with the Russians,
but within the framework of regional contingencies.
Unlike the Persian Gulf War, a war in which both
antagonists have means of effective remote striking ability
106
would have a very different character. A future opponent may
have the ability to conduct deep strikes in the theater of war
and conduct operations against high value air assets. Fixed
targets such as logistic sites, command and control and
intelligence centers, and airfields will likely become targets
for precision strikes. The destruction which Saddam Hussein
could have accomplished with the new Russian variant of the
SCUD missile incorporating precision guidance provides food
for thought. In such an environment, both the strategic and
tactical mobility of naval vessels would be greatly valued
both for rapid reaction and counterdetection.
Moreover, the military-technical revolution provides an
opportunity for naval forces to influence events ashore to a
degree unknown in the past. Col. A. N. Zakharov writes a major
trend in warfare
reflects the steady growth in the number of
air force and naval personnel and equipment
involved in engaging ground groupings, since
the capabilities of ground forces clearly are
becoming insufficient to defeat the enemy. The
Persian Gulf War is proof of this. 183
To effectively wage this new form of warfare by remote
strikes, the development of an effective strike capability and
the fusion of timely and effective intelligence with real-time
183 Zakharov, 5
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detection capabilities are required. In short, a
reconnaissance-strike complex which can operate effectively
in an overland power projection scenario.
Recently, there has discussion of doing away with naval
strike aviation altogether. A recent Proceedings article
stated the following:
[T]he most important and primary function of
the aircraft carrier is to establish air
superiority in the objective area-its aircraft
must subjugate enemy air forces so that the
rest of the Navy and Marine Corps can get on
with its assignment. The carrier exists for
the care and feeding of air-superiority
fighters-and everything else is secondary. 184
Such thinking is extremely short-sighted in that it views the
threat in the traditional air sphere, whereas the military-
technical revolution has rendered such distinctions
increasingly counterproductive. For example, highly accurate
cruise and ballistic missiles could inflict severe damage on
Marine beachheads and logistics areas despite the attainment
of "air superiority." Russian operational art has always
viewed air superiority as a combined arms effort, with a vital
role played by offensive air weapons, including strike
aircraft and ballistic missiles. Recent revelations that the
184 Charles E. Meyers Jr., "Time to Fold 'em," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July
1991, 40
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means of air defense alone cannot cope with the threat of
modern offensive air weapons indicates that such a strategy of
air superiority based on fighter aircraft alone is dangerously
flawed. In the Russian view, the offense dominated nature of
war makes it necessary to destroy air offensive weapons such
as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and precision guided
weaponry before they are launched.
Therefore, a capability for waging effective precision
strikes is imperative, not only with cruise missiles but also
with manned aircraft. The manned platform offers the
flexibility to counter attempts at deception and more
effectively engage mobile targets. To be effective, such a
platform must have both endurance and survivability.
Unfortunately, the current evolutionary development of the
F/A-18 E/F does not provide the necessary capability to fully
realize the potential offered by the changing nature of
warfare. Endurance both reduces dependence on Air Force tanker
assets, which are tied to increasingly vulnerable airfields,
and enhances carrier survivability by allowing greater sea
room to facilitate counterdetection. The Russians have
emphasized production of long range strike and escort assets
and curtailed production of shorter range aircraft such as the
MiG-29, because aircraft range is vital to both mission
accomplishment and survivability on the ground. The AF/X has
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both the stealth capability, endurance and strike potential to
fully take advantage of the opportunities offered by the
military-technical revolution.
If the AF/X is cancelled, the Navy could find itself in a
similar position to the Royal Navy at the onset of the Second
World War. The development of carrier striking power during
the Second World War had much common with the current
revolution in military affairs. The ability to conduct remote
strikes against naval vessels had replaced the concept of
contact between men-of-war in a line of battle as the decisive
element in naval warfare. However, the Royal Navy, despite
having a large carrier force, was unable to fully take
advantage of this revolution because its main striking
aircraft, the Swordfish, did not have the range and
effectiveness required. Similarly, the F/A-18 E/F may be
suitable as an interim step, but cancellation of the AF/X
would not allow the Navy to exploit the potential offered by
the military-technical revolution as others surely will do.
Another important lesson of the Gulf War is that while
nuclear warfare is inherently offense dominated, a nature of
the battle between air offensive weapons and air defense rests
primarily on technological sophistication, especially with
regards to electronic warfare, rather than any inherent
advantage in either ground-based or airborne platforms. The
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survivability of the naval air assets must be evaluated in the
light of the development of air defense capabilities such as
second-generation surface-to-air missile systems, such as the
SA-10, 12 and 15, which are now being aggressively marketed to
regional actors . Control of the electromagnetic spectrum in
the face of these sophisticated threats is essential , and the
EA-6B must have the ability to cope with these new systems to
ensure success in the power projection mission.
Another trend resulting from the revolution in military
affairs has been the vital need for effective and timely
intelligence and detection capabilities. Naval forces now have
the capability to project power ashore to a degree unmatched
in the past. However, intelligence and command and control
architecture must be in place to allow a clear view of not
only the naval and air picture in a region, but the ground
picture as well. As high-precision weaponry have enabled
targets to be reliably engaged and destroyed at great
distances, the limiting factor increasingly becomes detection
and intelligence capability. Fusion of information from such
platforms as JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Targeting Airborne
Radar System) will be vital to provide a comprehensive view of
the three-dimensional battlefield. Counterdetection strategies
such as increased mobility, signature suppression and false
targets will likely be an element in any future conflict and
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may confound targeting based on an Air Tasking Order (ATO)
system. The development of a true reconnaissance-strike
complex which can convert a fleeting detection into prompt
destruction will allow the U.S. Navy to fully take advantage
of the current military-technical revolution.
The importance of understanding the implications of the
military-technical revolution is vital for naval planners
thinking about future war. The concept of war by "remote
strikes" is, however, familiar to those who have studied
carrier operations in the Second World War. Conflict is short
and sharp as detection is quickly translated into destruction.
Therefore, deception and mobility are the key to survival.
Warfare is not limited by weapon effectiveness, but by the
ability to avoid detection. Intelligence and detection
capability are critical to mission success. And lastly,
technological superiority is more vital than superiority in
numbers. It is logical that, as the spheres of combat blend
together, the battlefield ashore will more closely resemble
war at sea.
It is important to note that the integration of scouting
and reconnaissance capabilities which occurred with the
development of the aircraft carrier represented the first true
realization of reconnaissance-strike complex. A current
carrier battlegroup, with its integration of strike capability
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with national and theater intelligence means and a real-time
wide area airborne detection capability fully represents the
realization of Marshal Ogarkov's vision. As the emphasis
shifts from war at sea to power projection ashore, as stated
in the "... From the Sea" document, the impressive
capabilities of the carrier battlegroup as a maritime
reconnaissance-strike complex must be extended to operate with
equal effectiveness in the overland environment. In this way,
the U.S. Navy can take advantage of the tremendous potential
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